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ABSTRACT	  
	  In	   this	   thesis,	   I	   address	   the	   question	   of	   Heidegger’s	   rejection	   of	  metaphor,	  alleging	   most	   of	   the	   commentary	   on	   this	   rejection	   has	   failed	   to	   confront	   its	  substance.	  	  In	  particular,	  I	  focus	  on	  two	  different	  interpretations,	  one	  given	  by	  Paul	  Ricoeur	  and	  the	  other	  by	  Jacques	  Derrida.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  accounts	  place	  Heidegger’s	  rejection	  in	  a	  model	  of	  language	  structured	  by	  the	  sign	  relation;	  however,	  I	  contend	  Heidegger	   rejects	  metaphor	   precisely	   in	  order	   to	  overcome	  this	  model	  of	   language.	  Heidegger's	   few	  references	   to	  metaphor	  occur	  within	  attempts	   to	  rethink	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  our	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  and	  our	  relationship	  to	  language;	  that	  is,	  he	  hopes	  to	  think	  the	  co-­‐belonging	  of	   language	  and	  body.	   	  As	  such,	  metaphor	  is	  not	  the	  best	  avenue	  to	  interpret	  Heidegger's	  peculiar	  language,	  particularly	  when	  such	  language	  occurs	  during	  the	  course	  of	  his	  thinking	  of	  the	  bodily	  articulation	  of	  speech.	  Likewise,	   it	   is	  most	  appropriate	  to	   locate	  Heidegger’s	  rejection	  of	  metaphor	  in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   thinking	   of	   the	   co-­‐belonging	   of	   language	   and	   body.	   	   Neither	  Ricoeur	   nor	   Derrida	   take	   this	   into	   account,	   focusing	   instead	   on	   the	   status	   of	  Heidegger’s	  language	  in	  general.	  	  But	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  claim	  that	  we	  are	  never	  to	  read	  any	  of	  his	  language	  as	  metaphorical	  or	  figurative,	  only	  not	  to	  do	  so	  when	  he	  is	  engaged	   in	   thinking	   the	   co-­‐belonging	   of	   body	   and	   language	   (the	   essence	   of	  language).	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  make	  a	  blanket	  assertion	  regarding	  the	  status	  of	  the	  whole	  range	  of	  Heidegger’s	  language.	  	  	   Heidegger	  takes	  pains	  to	  make	  clear	  we	  are	  not	  to	  understand	  his	  statements	  regarding	   the	  relationship	  of	  body	  and	   language	  as	  metaphorical,	   since	   this	  would	  retain	  the	  very	  model	  of	  language	  and	  body	  he	  hopes	  to	  overcome	  and	  think	  beyond.	  Ultimately,	  we	  see	  that	  Heidegger’s	  rejection	  of	  metaphor	  is	  linked	  to	  his	  attempt	  to	  
rethink	   the	   essence	   of	   language	   and	   the	   human	   being’s	   relationship	   to	   it;	   in	   the	  process,	   he	   provides	   a	   point	   of	   departure	   for	   a	   radical	   rethinking	   of	   human	  experience.	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CHAPTER	  1:	  INTRODUCTION	  
	  Heidegger’s	  peculiar	  language	  –	  what	  are	  we	  to	  make	  of	  it?	  	  That	  is,	  how	  are	  we	  to	  read	  his	  occasionally	  cryptic	  remarks?	  	  When	  he	  writes,	  “language	  is	  the	  house	  of	  being”	  or	  “language	  is	  the	  flower	  of	  the	  mouth,”	  how	  are	  we	  to	  understand	  these	  phrases?	   	   Is	   he	  merely	   speaking	  metaphorically	   or	   figuratively?	   Is	   he	   indulging	   in	  tautologies	  or	  non-­‐sensible	  statements?	  	  Is	  he	  exposing	  and	  illustrating	  the	  limits	  of	  what	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  say,	  or	  playing	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  meaning	  in	  language?	  Or	  is	   he	   engaged	   in	   a	   project	   that	   forces	   him	   to	   properly	   name	   being,	   which	   is	   an	  impossible	  task?	  	  	  	  	  	  	   All	  of	  these	  positions	  have	  been	  taken	  at	  one	  time	  or	  another	  and	  most	  of	  the	  debate	   has	   answered	   this	   question	   from	   the	   standpoint	   of	   metaphor;	   they	   claim	  Heidegger	   is	   employing	  metaphorical	  or	   figurative	  devices	   to	   the	  advantage	  of	  his	  text.1	  The	  most	   prominent	   contributors	   to	   this	   discussion	   have	   been	  Paul	   Ricoeur	  and	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  and	  both	  of	  them	  consider	  Heidegger’s	  peculiar	  language	  to	  be	  metaphorical,	  albeit	  in	  different	  ways.	  	  But	  this	  reading	  ignores	  Heidegger’s	   instruction	  not	  to	  read	  his	   language	  as	  metaphorical.	  	  The	  question	  then	  arises:	  why	  does	  Heidegger	  reject	  metaphor?	  Is	  it	  merely	  to	  complicate	  the	  reading	  of	  his	  text?	  Or	  is	  there	  another,	  less	  trivial	  reason?	  Assuming	   that	   Heidegger	   has	   simply	   been	   profiting	   from	   metaphor’s	  semantic	  fecundity	  -­‐	  as	  does	  Ricoeur	  –	  is	  reasonable,	  as	  this	  aspect	  of	  metaphor	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  philosophical	  discussion	  from	  the	  time	  of	  Aristotle.	  	  About	  2000	  years	   later,	   Nietzsche	  writes,	   “What,	   then,	   is	   truth?	   A	  mobile	   army	   of	  metaphors,	  metonyms,	  and	  anthropomorphisms…”	   thereby	   linking	  metaphor	  directly	  with	   the	  production	  of	  truth.2	  	  And	  other	  thinkers,	  such	  as	  Max	  Black	  and	  Paul	  Ricoeur,	  have	  noted	   the	   heuristic	   capacity	   of	  metaphor	   and	   even	   associated	  metaphor	  with	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Hillis	  Miller	  writes,	  “Heidegger’s	  trick	  is	  to	  affirm	  that	  analogies	  or	  figurative	  displacements	  are	  identities.	  	  He	  must	  forget,	  and	  lead	  us	  to	  forget,	  that	  they	  are	  figurative	  substitutions	  if	  he	  wants	  to	  claim	  he	  has	  purified	  language	  of	  all	  rhetoric	  or	  figuration	  and	  can	  write	  as	  an	  absolute	  literalist.”	  (J.	  Hillis	  Miller,	  Topographies).	  	  Guisuppe	  Stellardi	  writes,	  “Heidegger’s	  text	  is	  overrun	  with	  metaphor.	  	  Expelled,	  metaphor	  comes	  back,	  uninvited,	  all	  the	  time,	  which	  would	  explain	  the	  occasional	  reaction,	  at	  times	  almost	  violent,	  of	  the	  author	  and	  master.”	  And,	  less	  dramatically,	  “In	  Heidegger’s	  text	  there	  is	  metaphor.”	  (Stellardi,	  Heidegger	  and	  Derrida	  on	  
Philosophy	  and	  Metaphor,	  p.	  133,	  130)	  Paul	  Ricoeur	  writes,	  “In	  Heidegger	  himself	  the	  context	  considerably	  limits	  the	  import	  of	  this	  attack	  on	  metaphor,	  so	  that	  one	  may	  come	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  constant	  use	  Heidegger	  makes	  of	  metaphor	  is	  finally	  more	  important	  than	  what	  he	  says	  in	  passing	  against	  metaphor.”	  (Ricoeur,	  
The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  280)	  In	  regard	  to	  this	  aspect	  of	  Ricoeur’s	  conclusion,	  Derrida	  writes,	  “I	  would	  quite	  willingly	  subscribe	  to	  this	  assertion.”	  (Derrida,“The	  Retrait	  of	  Metaphor,”	  Psyche	  p.	  64)	  Also,	  see	  Casenave,	  Greisch,	  Lafont,	  Edwards.	  	  2Nietzsche,	  Friedrich.	  “On	  Truth	  and	  Lie	  in	  an	  Extra-­‐Moral	  Sense,”	  The	  Portable	  
Nietzsche	  p.	  46-­‐47	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creation	   of	   meaning	   in	   language. 3 	  	   There	   is	   a	   longstanding	   tradition	   linking	  metaphor	  with	  both	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  world	  and	  conceptual	  production.	  	  	  	   I	   contend,	   however,	   that	  metaphor	   is	   not	   the	   best	   point	   of	   departure	   from	  which	   to	   interpret	   Heidegger’s	   peculiar	   language.4	  	   His	   language	   strikes	   us	   as	  strange,	  not	  because	  he	  is	  employing	  radical	  metaphors,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  difficulty	  of	  his	  project.	  	  In	  his	  mind,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  name	  the	  essence	  of	  language:	  he	  writes,	  “There	   is	   some	   evidence	   that	   the	   essential	   nature	   of	   language	   refuses	   to	   express	  itself	   in	   words	   –	   in	   the	   language…	   	   in	   which	   we	   use	   to	   make	   statements	   about	  language.”5	  If	  were	  interpret	  his	  peculiar	  language	  as	  metaphorical,	  we	  pigeonhole	  it	  as	   merely	   figurative,	   a	   play	   on	   words,	   and	   thus	   shy	   away	   from	   the	   difficult	   task	  presented	  by	  it.	  	  Since	  Aristotle,	  language	  has	  primarily	  been	  conceived	  of	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  sign	  relation;	  words	  have	  been	  taken	  as	  signs	  that	  correspond	  to	  things.6	  This	  model	  was	  applied,	  not	  only	   to	  words,	  but	  also	   to	   the	  bodily	  production	  of	  speech	  and	   to	  our	  model	  of	  perception	  general.7	  According	  to	  Aristotle,	  when	  we	  speak,	  we	  make	  vocal	  sounds	  that	  are	  the	  signs	  of	  our	  inner	  states.	  The	  sign	  relation	  structures	  this	  model;	  it	   posits,	   at	   the	   very	   basis	   of	   language,	   an	   opposition	   between	   sensibility	   and	  intelligibility	  that	  is	  instantiated	  by	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  physical	  sign	  and	  its	  intelligible	  meaning.	   Letters	   are	   the	   signs	   of	   sounds,	   and	   sounds	   are	   the	   signs	   of	  mental	   events.	   We	   can	   see,	   then,	   a	   sharp	   division	   between	   sensibility	   and	  intelligibility,	  a	  division	  that	  is	  structured	  by	  the	  sign	  relation.	  	  For	  Heidegger,	  this	  opposition	  misconstrues	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  phenomena	  of	  language.	   	   It	   is	   not	   that	   this	  way	   of	   thinking	   of	   language	   is	  wrong,	  per	   se;	   rather,	  Heidegger	  simply	  believes	  this	  model	   inadequate	   for	  describing	  the	  breadth	  of	   the	  human	  being’s	  relationship	  to	  language.	  	  In	  his	  mind,	  the	  sign	  relation	  obscures	  our	  fundamental	   experience	   with	   language.	   Consider,	   for	   example,	   the	   phrase	   “I	   love	  you.”	   These	   words	   can	   be	   extremely	   powerful	   and	   have	   effects	   beyond	   the	   bare	  perception	   of	   linguistic	   data:	   they	  have	   a	   transformative	   capacity.	   They	   can	   cause	  your	   heart	   to	   race	   and	   your	   palms	   to	   sweat.	   	   How	   does	   a	   bald	   sign	   cause	   one	   to	  sweat?	  Is	  it	  correct	  to	  say	  the	  sign	  causes	  these	  bodily	  phenomena?	  Or	  does	  this	  way	  construing	   the	   relationship	   between	   body	   and	   word	   distort	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  phenomenon?	   These	   effects	   on	   the	   body	   suggest	   that	  we	   (as	   humans)	   experience	  language	  in	  a	  way	  that	  cannot	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  the	  sign	  relation.	  This	  indicates	  a	  radically	   different	   way	   of	   thinking	   about	   language,	   wherein	   language	   cannot	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See	  Black,	  “Metaphor”	  and	  “Models	  and	  Metaphor.”	  	  4	  The	  astute	  reader	  will	  notice	  I	  have	  refrained	  from	  labeling	  Heidegger’s	  language	  in	  terms	  of	  metaphor,	  instead	  referring	  to	  it	  as	  “peculiar.”	  	  	  5	  “The	  Nature	  of	  Language,”	  On	  the	  Way	  to	  Language,	  p.	  81	  	  6	  According	  to	  Aristotle,	  written	  words	  represent	  vocal	  sounds,	  which	  represent	  	  “what	  there	  is	  in	  the	  soul	  by	  way	  of	  passions.”	  On	  Interpretation,	  Heidegger’s	  translation,	  found	  in	  “The	  Nature	  of	  Language,”	  On	  the	  Way	  to	  Language,	  p.	  97.	  	  7	  This	  framework	  is	  common	  today,	  wherein	  the	  sense	  organs	  funnel	  raw	  abstract	  sense	  data	  to	  the	  brain,	  which	  then	  interprets	  the	  data	  and	  makes	  it	  intelligible.	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thought	   apart	   from	   the	   body	   and	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	   Furthermore,	   Heidegger	  claims	  the	  sign	  relation	  underlies	  all	  traditional	  accounts	  of	  the	  human	  experience	  of	  the	  world;	  as	  such,	  the	  fundamental	  nature	  of	  our	  relationship	  to	  language	  has	  been	  obscured	  and	  concealed.	   	  Heidegger	  hopes	   to	   rethink	   language	   in	   such	  a	  way	   that	  the	   sensible/intelligible	   opposition	   and	   the	   sign	   relation	   are	   not	   injected	   into	   the	  fundamental	  levels	  of	  the	  analysis.	  	  This	  represents	  nothing	  less	  than	  an	  attempt	  to	  
fundamentally	  rethink	  the	  human	  experience	  of	  language	  and	  meaning.	  The	  extent	   to	  which	   this	   rethinking	  of	   language	  affects	  how	  we	  conceive	  of	  the	   human	   experience	   in	   the	  world	   can	   be	   seen	   in	  Heidegger’s	   phenomenological	  analyses	  of	  hearing,	  which	  reveal	  sound	  and	  meaning	  to	  be	  unified	  and	  inseparable.8	  That	   is,	   his	   rethinking	   of	   language	   extends	   from	   mere	   linguistic	   analysis	   to	   a	  fundamental	  rethinking	  of	  the	  human	  experience	  in	  the	  world,	  to	  how	  we	  perceive	  and	   experience	   ourselves	   in	   the	   world.	   	   If	   Heidegger	   can	   show	   that	   the	  sensible/intelligible	   opposition	   and	   the	   sign	   relation	   are	   not	   found	   in	   the	  fundamental	  way	  we	  experience	  language,	  this	  gestures	  toward	  a	  way	  of	  regarding	  the	  human	  experience	  that	  is	  radically	  different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  tradition.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  course	  of	  this	  this	  rethinking	  of	  human	  experience	  as	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	   that	   Heidegger	   rejects	   metaphor.9	  	   Metaphor,	   as	   we	   shall	   see,	   implies	   a	  sensible/intelligible	  distinction:	  it	  entails	  a	  sense	  experience	  that	  is	  only	  later	  made	  intelligible	   through	   recourse	   to	   metaphor.	   	   This	   separation	   of	   sensibility	   and	  intelligibility	  relies	  upon	  the	  sign	  relation	  for	  its	  cogency.	  If,	  however,	  Heidegger	  has	  demonstrated	  the	  unity	  of	  sound	  and	  meaning	  in	  his	  phenomenological	  analysis	  of	  hearing,	  then	  the	  metaphor	  is	  unsuited	  to	  describe	  our	  fundamental	  mode	  of	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  means	  The	   radical	   nature	   of	   Heidegger’s	   project	   is	   made	   apparent	   by	   the	  widespread	   inability	   of	   commentator’s	   to	   think	   of	   language	   in	   general,	   and	  Heidegger’s	   language	   in	   particular,	   non-­‐metaphorically.	   Metaphor	   has	   long	   been	  ascribed	   a	   primary	   role	   in	   the	   discovery	   and	   uncovering	   of	   the	   world.	   When	  Heidegger	  tries	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  the	  bodily	  articulation	  of	  speech	  that	  does	  not	  employ	  a	   sensible/intelligible	  opposition	  or	   the	   sign	   relation,	  his	   language	   sounds	  peculiar:	  the	  commentator’s	  quickly	  label	  his	  language	  metaphoric	  or	  figurative.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  A	  “phenomenological	  analysis”	  is	  a	  rigorous	  description	  of	  a	  phenomenon	  devoid	  of	  theoretical	  presuppositions.	  	  By	  focusing	  on	  pure	  description	  of	  phenomena,	  phenomenology	  hoped	  it	  could	  attend	  to	  beings	  as	  they	  are,	  not	  as	  they	  appear	  when	  saddled	  with	  erroneous	  theoretical	  assumptions.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  phenomenological	  analysis	  of	  hearing,	  Heidegger	  hopes	  an	  attentive	  description	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  hearing	  will	  disarticulate	  the	  sign	  relation	  model	  of	  hearing,	  thus	  pointing	  the	  way	  to	  thinking	  about	  the	  phenomenon	  that	  attends	  to	  the	  experience	  as	  it	  really	  unfolds.	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  	  9	  “Being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world”	  is	  a	  term	  used	  by	  Heidegger	  to	  indicate	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  humans	  are	  always	  in	  a	  world	  and	  among	  beings.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  human	  is	  not	  understandable	  apart	  from	  the	  world	  in	  which	  it	  is.	  	  Characterizing	  humans	  in	  this	  way	  avoids	  the	  subject/object	  and	  inner/exterior	  oppositions	  that	  frequently	  had	  structured	  notions	  of	  the	  human	  being	  in	  philosophy	  since	  Descartes.	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Heidegger	   thinks	   of	   language	   very	   broadly;	   it	   is	   more	   than	   just	   the	   set	   of	  words	   in	   the	   dictionary.	   Furthermore,	   he	   sees	   metaphor	   as	   embedded	   in	   and	  complicit	   with	   the	   sign	   relation.	   	   My	   contention	   is	   that	   the	   two	   most	   notable	  contributors	   who	   discuss	   Heidegger’s	   language,	   Ricoeur	   and	   Derrida,	   fail	   to	  adequately	  locate	  Heidegger’s	  few	  remarks	  pertaining	  explicitly	  to	  metaphor	  in	  the	  context	  in	  which	  they	  occur,	  i.e.	  a	  thinking	  of	  the	  relationship	  of	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  originary	  understanding,	  and	  language.10	  	  This	  divergence	  forces	  their	  reading	  of	  his	  peculiar	   language	   into	  a	   framework	  structured	  by	   the	  sign	  relation.	   	  As	  such,	   they	  read	   his	   remarks	   on	   metaphor,	   as	   well	   as	   his	   particular	   style	   of	   language,	   in	   a	  watered-­‐down	  manner.	   	  By	   retaining	   the	  notion	  of	  metaphoricity,	   they	  are	  barred	  from	  confronting	  the	  substance	  of	  Heidegger’s	  analysis	  of	  language.	  	  I	  will	  then	  offer	  an	  account	  of	  Heidegger’s	  views	  on	  the	  essence	  of	  language,	  and	  orient	  his	  rejection	  of	  metaphor	  toward	  this	  account.	  Ultimately,	  we	  will	  see	  that	  Heidegger’s	  rejection	  of	  metaphor	  is	  linked	  to	  his	  attempt	   to	   rethink	  the	  essence	  of	   language	  and	  the	  human	  being’s	  relationship	  to	   it.	  Furthermore,	   in	  doing	  so,	  he	   is	  attempting	   to	  develop	  a	  new	  understanding	  of	   the	  human	   being’s	   relationship	   to	   the	   world.11	  	   In	   Heidegger’s	   mind,	   humans	   have	   a	  distinctive	   capacity	   for	   language:	   it	   reflects	   their	   unique	   relationship	   to	   being,	  inasmuch	   as	   they	   are	   the	   being	   that	   “discovers	   the	   world	   and	   Dasein	   itself.”12	  Rethinking	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  relationship	  to	  language,	  then,	  means	  nothing	  less	  than	  rethinking	  how	  human	  beings	  exist	  in	  the	  world.	  	  	  	   Chapter	   1:	   Ricoeur	   approaches	   the	   question	   of	   Heidegger’s	   relationship	   to	  metaphor	   through	   a	   larger	   project,	   namely	   a	   study	   of	   the	   creation	   of	  meaning	   in	  language.	  	  (In	  fact,	  this	  is	  the	  subtitle	  of	  his	  book	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor).	   	  As	  such,	  a	  discussion	  of	  his	  views	  on	  language	  and	  disclosure	  will	  provide	  a	  helpful	  context	  for	  his	  views	  on	  metaphor,	  since	  he	  posits	  it	  as	  the	  basic	  mechanism	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  meaning	   in	   language.	   	  Next,	   the	  ontological	   implications	  of	  his	   theory	  of	  metaphor	  will	   be	   teased	   out,	   providing	   a	   background	   from	   which	   we	   can	   approach	   and	  evaluate	  his	  interpretation	  of	  Heidegger’s	  relationship	  to	  metaphor.	  	  Ultimately,	  we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Heidegger	  contends	  that,	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  humans	  always	  have	  an	  understanding	  of	  where	  they	  are	  and	  what	  they	  are	  doing,	  broadly	  speaking.	  	  This	  understanding	  is	  anterior	  to	  conscious	  awareness;	  it	  structures	  how	  we	  think	  of	  ourselves	  and	  how	  we	  go	  about	  our	  lives,	  but	  is	  an	  understanding	  that	  is	  always	  operating	  prior	  to	  explicit	  awareness	  or	  reflection.	  	  11	  This	  goal	  of	  rethinking	  human	  beings	  is	  reflected	  in	  early	  Heidegger’s	  characterization	  of	  the	  human	  being	  as	  “Dasein.”	  Dasein	  is	  a	  German	  word	  that	  literally	  means	  “being-­‐there;”	  Heidegger	  uses	  it	  to	  capture	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  humans	  exist	  in	  the	  world	  among	  beings.	  Dasein	  is	  always	  already	  in	  a	  world	  it	  understands	  at	  a	  pre-­‐reflective	  level.	  	  By	  using	  this	  term,	  Heidegger	  hopes	  to	  guide	  the	  reader	  away	  from	  importing	  traditional	  models	  of	  human	  existence	  into	  his	  thought.	  	  But	  this	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  word	  choice;	  Heidegger	  claims	  this	  is	  essential	  to	  allow	  us	  to	  think	  the	  “relation	  of	  being	  to	  the	  essence	  of	  man.”	  	  See	  “Introduction	  to	  ‘What	  is	  Metaphysics?’”	  Pathmarks,	  p.	  283.	  	  12	  Heidegger,	  Being	  and	  Time,	  p.	  209	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will	   see	   that	   Ricoeur	   and	  Heidegger	   think	   of	  metaphor	   in	   different	  ways;	   Ricoeur	  sees	  metaphor	  as	  intrinsic	  to	  a	  thinking	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  language,	  while	  Heidegger	  claims	   metaphor	   merely	   obscures	   it.	   This	   difference	   shapes	   Ricoeur’s	   reading	   of	  Heidegger’s	   language,	   leading	   him	   away	   from	   pursuing	   a	   substantial	   aspect	   of	  Heidegger’s	  project.	  	   Chapter	  2:	  Derrida	  places	  Heidegger’s	  rejection	  of	  metaphor	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  displacement	  and	  deferral	  entailed	  by	  the	  attempt	  to	  name	  being.	  	  As	  such,	  he	  is	  confined	   to	   reading	   Heidegger’s	   language	   in	   a	   framework	   structured	   by	   the	   sign	  relation,	  a	  limitation	  that	  prevents	  him	  from	  addressing	  Heidegger’s	  larger	  concern	  with	  metaphor,	  namely,	  a	  thinking	  of	  the	  relation	  of	  dasein’s	  originary	  openness	  to	  beings	   and	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	   upon	  which	   the	   sign	   relation	  model	   of	   language	   is	  made	  possible.	   	  The	  extent	  of	   this	  divergence	  will	  be	   laid	  out	  through	  a	  reading	  of	  Derrida’s	   analysis	   of	   the	   implication	   of	   metaphor	   and	   philosophy,	   leading	   to	   an	  exegesis	   of	   his	   notion	   of	   “quasi-­‐metaphoricity”	   that	   makes	   the	   distance	   between	  Heidegger	  and	  Derrida	  clear.	  	   Chapter	   3:	   Heidegger’s	   rejection	   of	  metaphor	   should	   be	   understood	   in	   the	  context	   of	   his	   rethinking	   of	   the	   relation	   of	   bodily	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	   dasein’s	  originary	  openness	  to	  beings,	  and	  the	  essence	  of	  language.	  	  Language	  calls	  beings	  to	  presence	  out	  of	  the	  originary	  openness	  to	  beings.13	  	  In	  his	  mind,	  metaphor	  prevents	  one	   from	   thinking	   the	   essence	   of	   language,	   as	   it	   implies	   a	   sensible/intelligible	  opposition	   (and	   therefore	   the	   sign	   relation)	   at	   the	   fundamental	   level	   of	   our	  originary	   openness	   to	   beings.	   Through	   the	   background	   of	   Heidegger’s	   views	   on	  language,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  he	  rejects	  metaphor	  primarily	  because	  it	  bars	  his	  effort	  to	  think	  the	  relationship	  of	  the	  originary	  openness	  to	  beings	  and	  our	  bodily	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	   Ricoeur	   and	   Derrida,	   however,	   read	   Heidegger’s	   text	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	  their	  own	  views	  on	  language,	  in	  which	  metaphor	  plays	  a	  substantial	  role.	  	  As	  such,	  they	  fail	  to	  address	  a	  significant	  aspect	  of	  Heidegger’s	  thought.	  	  	  A	   short	   review	   of	   a	   traditional	   concept	   of	  metaphor	  will	   provide	   a	   helpful	  background	   against	   which	  we	  may	   situate	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   paper.	   	   Similarly,	   since	  Heidegger’s	  views	  of	  language	  will	  not	  be	  discussed	  at	  length	  until	  Chapter	  4,	  a	  brief	  review	  of	  his	   views	  on	   the	  essence	  of	   language	  will	  provide	  a	  useful	   counterpoint	  that	   will	   guide	   the	   analysis	   and	   flesh	   out	   some	   of	   the	   differences	   between	   him,	  Ricoeur,	  and	  Derrida.	  	  	  	  	  	  1.1	  Aristotle	  and	  a	  Classic	  Account	  of	  Metaphor	  As	   indicated	   above,	   Aristotle	   is	   the	   first	   thinker	   to	   produce	   a	   concept	   of	  metaphor;	   this	   notion	   is	   similar	   to	   a	   colloquial	   account	   of	   metaphor.	   	   His	   view	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  “Originary	  openness	  to	  beings”	  indicates	  the	  distinctive	  relationship	  to	  beings	  that	  characterizes	  Dasein.	  Dasein	  is	  the	  being	  that	  can	  discover	  the	  world	  and	  use	  language:	  it	  is	  the	  being	  that	  can	  ask	  the	  question	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  being.	  	  It	  can	  only	  do	  this,	  however,	  since	  it	  “surpasses”	  beings.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  Dasein	  is	  not	  held	  captive	  by	  a	  particular	  appearance	  of	  beings;	  beings	  can	  appear	  in	  different	  ways	  to	  Dasein.	  	  This	  implies	  that	  Dasein	  “surpasses”	  beings,	  inasmuch	  it	  is	  the	  being	  to	  which	  beings	  can	  appear	  in	  different	  ways,	  and	  allows	  Dasein	  to	  orient	  itself	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  world.	  	  See	  “On	  the	  Essence	  of	  Ground,”	  Pathmarks,	  p.	  108-­‐109	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centers	  on	  the	  transfer	  of	  a	  name,	  i.e.	  transferring	  a	  name	  that	  belongs	  to	  one	  thing	  onto	  something	  else.14	  	  For	  example,	  when	  we	  say,	  “love	  is	  war,”	  we	  are	  transferring	  the	  name	  of	  “war”	  onto	  that	  of	  “love”;	  this	  transferal	  reveals	  a	  resemblance	  between	  love	  and	  war.	  	  The	  metaphor	  helps	  us	  to	  see	  aspects	  of	  love	  that	  are	  warlike.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  metaphor	  consists	  in	  finding	  resemblances	  between	  seemingly	  unlike	  things,	  and	  pointing	  these	  resemblances	  out	  through	  the	  transfer	  of	  a	  name.	  	   In	   this	   framework,	   a	   metaphor	   is	   a	   word	   that	   replaces	   another,	   different	  word,	   and	   this	   reveals	   a	   resemblance	   between	   two	   unlike	   things.	   	   Metonymy,	   by	  way	  of	  contrast,	  replaces	  a	  word	  for	  the	  whole	  with	  a	  word	  that	  designates	  one	  of	  its	  parts:	   in	   “the	   sail	  broke	   the	  horizon”,	   the	  word	   ”sail”	   replaces	   the	   idea	   “boat.”	  We	  understand	  the	  part	  “sail”	  implies	  the	  whole	  “boat.”	  There	  is	  already	  a	  relationship	  between	   the	   two	  words,	   and	   it	   forms	   the	   condition	  of	  possibility	  of	   the	  metonym.	  	  Metaphor,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  replaces	  one	  word	  with	  another,	  different	  word	  whose	  common	  meaning	   and	   associations	   are	   different.	   	   This	   different	  word	   connects	   to	  the	  word	  it	  replaces	  by	  means	  of	  a	  resemblance.	  When	  we	  say,	  for	  example,	  “love	  is	  war,”	   the	   word	   “war”	   is	   substituted	   for	   the	   ordinary	   word	   “love”	   and	   there	   is	   a	  transfer	   of	   meaning,	   from	   war	   to	   love.	   	   This	   metaphor	   is	   then	   founded	   upon	   a	  ground	  of	  resemblance.	  	   Metaphor,	   so	   conceived,	   tends	   to	   be	   identified	   with	   style,	   with	   the	   value	   of	  “making	  a	  point	  well”;	  this	  is	  in	  accord	  with	  Aristotle’s	  treatment	  of	  it	  in	  Poetics.	   	  A	  listener,	  Aristotle	   claims,	  upon	  hearing	  and	  deciphering	  wordplay,	   feels	  a	   sense	  of	  satisfaction	  similar	  to	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  solving	  a	  puzzle.	  	  This	  pleasure,	  along	  with	  metaphor’s	  capacity	  for	  coloring	  and	  animating	  language,	  accounts	  for	  its	  use.15	  	  It	  is	  important	   to	   note,	   however,	   that	  while	  metaphor	   serves	   a	   rhetorical	   purpose,	   the	  ordinary	  meaning	   on	  which	   it	   is	   founded	   is	   always	   accessible	   if	   one	   replaces	   the	  metaphorical	  words	  with	  the	  ordinary	  ones	   it	  replaces.	   	  For	  Aristotle,	  metaphor	   is	  mostly	  related	  to	  stylistics.	  	  	   But	  Aristotle	  also	  acknowledges	  what	  he	  sees	  as	  a	  certain	  value	  in	  metaphor,	  complementing	  those	  he	  calls	  a	  “master	  of	  metaphor.”	  	  Since	  a	  metaphor	  hinges	  on	  a	  previously	  unseen	  resemblance,	  it	  involves	  an	  “intuitive	  perception	  of	  dissimiliars”;	  a	   skill,	   writes	   Aristotle,	   which	   cannot	   be	   learned	   from	   others	   and	   is	   a	   sign	   of	  genius.16	  While	   metaphor	   is	   largely	   relegated	   to	   a	   stylistic	   turn,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	  Aristotle	  does	  esteem	  the	  skill	  involved	  in	  making	  quality	  metaphors.	  	   The	   hallmarks	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   metaphor	   are	   evident	   in	   Aristotle’s	  description.	  Metaphor	  depends	  upon	  a	  resemblance;	  by	  comparing	  unlike	  things,	  it	  can	  reveal	  the	  world	  around	  us.	  	  By	  characterizing	  the	  apprehension	  of	  resemblance	  under	   the	   transfer	   of	   a	   name,	   the	   concept	   of	   metaphor	   is	   structured	   by	   the	   sign	  relation:	  it	  immediately	  confines	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  meaning	  to	  this	  	  framework.	   The	   fundamental	   role	   attributed	   to	   the	   sign	   relation	   in	   metaphor	  persists,	  with	  a	  few	  alterations,	  up	  to	  the	  present	  day.17	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Aristotle,	  Poetics,	  1457b	  7-­‐9	  	  15	  Aristotle,	  Rhetoric,	  1405b	  4-­‐6,	  1411b	  24	  –	  1412a	  20	  	  16	  Poetics,	  1459a	  5-­‐8;	  Aristotle	  also	  refers	  to	  this	  in	  Rhetoric	  1405a	  8-­‐10.	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  1.2	  Heidegger	  and	  the	  Right	  Concept	  of	  Language	  As	   noted	   above,	   Heidegger	   has	   an	   unusual	   point	   of	   view	   with	   regard	   to	  language.	   	  Unlike	  most	  philosophers	  of	   language,	  Heidegger	   is	  not	   concerned	  with	  
language	  per	  se;	  that	  is,	  he	  is	  not	  interested	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  verbal	  meaning,	  or	  how	  we	   use	   language	   in	   everyday	   situations.	   	   Nor	   is	   he	   interested	   only	   in	   words,	  understood	   as	   linguistic	   units.	   	   Instead,	   Heidegger	   is	   interested	   in	   the	   distinctive	  relationship	  to	  being	  that	  makes	   it	  possible	   for	  humans	  to	  use	   language,	   that	   is,	   to	  speak.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  for	  Heidegger,	  speaking	  does	  not	  primarily	  mean	  to	   communicate	  using	   sound;	  even	  animals	  have	   the	  capacity	   to	  do	   this,	   and	  he	   is	  not	   interested	   in	   how	   animals	   communicate	  with	   each	   other.	   	   Heidegger	   believes	  humans	   have	   a	   distinctive	   relationship	   to	   language,	   one	   not	   reducible	   to	  communication,	  and	  his	  goal	  is	  to	  think	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  unique	  relationship.	  In	   order	   to	   do	   this,	   we	   need	   “the	   right	   concept	   of	   language.”18	  We	   cannot	  think	  the	  essence	  of	  language	  if	  we	  employ	  a	  concept	  of	  language	  that	  is	  limited	  to	  models	   of	   communication	   or	   a	   simple	   sign	   system:	   Heidegger	   believes	   our	  relationship	  to	  language	  is	  richer	  than	  these	  could	  account	  for.	  	  As	  such,	  traditional	  models	   of	   language	   (which	   Heidegger	   declares	   are	   all	   structured	   by	   the	   sign	  relation)	  are	  not	  up	  to	  the	  task	  presented	  by	  his	  project.19	  Language,	   according	  Heidegger,	  brings	  beings	  out	   into	   the	  open;	   it	   “shows”	  beings.	   But	   it	   does	   not	   create	   the	   being	   or	   beings;	   rather,	   it	   attends	   to	   how	   the	  beings	  come	  to	  presence	  of	  their	  own	  accord.	  	  But	  in	  showing	  beings,	  it	  also	  shapes	  the	  way	  in	  which	  beings	  come	  to	  presence.	   	  This	   is	  a	  drastically	  different	  model	  of	  language	  from	  the	  one	  implied	  by	  the	  sign	  relation,	  the	  model	  of	  language	  on	  which	  metaphor	  relies.	  	  Furthermore,	   Heidegger’s	   notion	   of	   language	   implies	   a	   re-­‐thinking	   of	  perception.	  	  If	  language	  is	  not	  to	  be	  understood	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  the	  sign	  relation,	  then	   we	   can	   no	   longer	   think	   of	   perception	   as	   the	   adding	   on	   of	   an	   intelligible	  meaning	   onto	   abstract,	   non-­‐meaningful	   sense	   data.	   	   As	   such,	   Heidegger’s	   thought	  gestures	   to	   a	   radical	   rethinking	   of	   the	   very	   way	  we	   experience	   our	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	   	   It	   is	   in	   order	   to	   facilitate	   this	   rethinking	   of	   bodily	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	   that	  Heidegger	   instructs	   us	   not	   to	   read	   his	   peculiar	   language	   as	  metaphorical.	   	  When	  Ricoeur	   and	   Derrida	   place	   his	   rejection	   within	   other	   contexts,	   this	   aspect	   of	   his	  thought	  becomes	  lost.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Ricoeur	  provides	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  metaphor	  all	  the	  way	  from	  Aristotle	  to	  Max	  Black	  and	  the	  20th	  century.	  	  If	  anything,	  these	  alterations	  have	  only	  granted	  metaphor	  a	  larger	  role	  to	  play	  in	  language;	  many	  theorists	  (such	  as	  Ricoeur)	  see	  metaphor	  as	  the	  engine	  that	  drives	  the	  emergence	  of	  meaning	  and	  our	  discovery	  of	  the	  world.	  See	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor.	  	  	  18	  “The	  Origin	  of	  the	  Work	  of	  Art,”	  Poetry,	  Language,	  Thought,	  p.	  71	  	  19	  “The	  Way	  to	  Language,”	  On	  the	  Way	  to	  Language,	  p.	  114-­‐115	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CHAPTER	  2:	  RICOEUR	  
	  
	   Ricoeur	   approaches	   the	   question	   of	   Heidegger’s	   relationship	   to	   metaphor	  through	  a	  larger	  project,	  namely,	  a	  study	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  meaning	  in	  language.	  Metaphor,	  on	  his	  account,	   is	  a	   fundamental	  element	   in	  this	  process:	   through	  it,	  we	  are	   able	   to	   discover	   the	   world	   and	   create	   new	   concepts.	   	   Metaphors	   are	   used	   to	  open	   up	   new	   conceptual	   networks,	   allowing	   for	   new	   ways	   of	   thinking	   about	   the	  world.	  	   Likewise,	   Ricoeur	   understands	   the	   question	   of	   Heidegger’s	   relationship	   to	  metaphor	   through	   his	   own	   view	   of	   metaphor’s	   semantic	   fecundity,	   alleging	  Heidegger’s	   peculiar	   language	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   strange	   metaphors	   he	  employs	   to	   enable	   us	   to	   think	   about	   the	   world	   in	   different	   ways.	   	   According	   to	  Ricoeur,	   this	   where	   the	   power	   of	   Heidegger’s	   text	   lies:	   in	   its	   strange	  metaphors.	  	  Ricoeur	   paints	   Heidegger’s	   rejection	   of	   metaphor	   as	   hubris,	   a	   vain	   attempt	   to	  consider	  himself	  the	  first	  thinker	  to	  overcome	  metaphysics.	  	   By	   reading	   Heidegger’s	   text	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   metaphor,	   Ricoeur	   is	  prevented	   from	  encountering	  Heidegger’s	   rethinking	   of	   bodily	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  	  Metaphor	   implies	   a	   view	   of	   language	   structured	   by	   the	   sensible/intelligible	  opposition	  and	  the	  sign	  relation:	  through	  these	  networks,	  it	  shapes	  how	  we	  conceive	  of	   phenomenal	   experience.	   	   Ricoeur,	   because	   of	   his	   views	   on	   the	   role	   metaphor	  plays	  in	  language,	  is	  barred	  from	  addressing	  this	  avenue	  of	  thought.	  	  	   	  	  2.1	  Ricoeur,	  Metaphor,	  and	  the	  Emergence	  of	  Meaning	  In	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  Ricoeur	  contends	  the	  occurrence	  of	  language	  is	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  signification	  and	  meaning.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  language	  is	  the	  medium	  through	  which	  meaning	  is	  created	  and	  extended.	  	  Metaphor	  helps	  us	  to	   discover	   the	  world	   by	   revealing	   connections	   and	   relations	   that	   had	   previously	  remained	   unseen.	   For	   Ricoeur,	   this	   opening	   up	   of	   signification	   and	   meaning	   in	  language	  depends	  on	  and	  begins	  with	  metaphor,	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  allows	  the	  speaker	  and	  the	  hearer	  to	  see	  previously	  unseen	  resemblances.	  	  The	  metaphorical	  discovery	  is	  initially	  subject	  to	  an	  unregulated	  plurality,	  and	  as	  such	  it	  remains	  unsuitable	  for	  use	  in	  fields	  that	  rely	  on	  stable,	  fixed	  concepts	  (such	  as	  the	  sciences,	  for	  example).	  As	  the	  metaphor	   is	   subject	   to	  philosophical	   scrutiny,	  however,	   this	  plurality	  becomes	  regulated,	   and	   a	   fixed,	   cogent	   concept	   or	  meaning	   results,	   a	  meaning	   that	   can	   be	  legitimately	  relied	  upon	  in	  speculative	  thought	  as	  an	  admissible	  concept.	  	   Speaking	   of	   Ricoeur’s	   take	   on	  metaphor	   in	   this	  way	   is	   somewhat	   pedantic,	  however;	  it	  makes	  something	  rather	  simple	  needlessly	  complex.	  	  His	  view	  descends	  from	  Aristotle’s	  well-­‐known	  formulation	  of	  metaphor	  as	  substitution	  and	  semantic	  transfer.20	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  think	  of	  Ricoeur’s	  metaphor	  in	  these	  terms:	  Jane	  Doe	  has	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  There	  are	  some	  notable	  differences	  between	  Aristotle’s	  and	  Ricoeur’s	  accounts,	  namely	  the	  scope	  of	  metaphor	  (from	  the	  level	  of	  the	  substitution	  word	  to	  the	  level	  of	  re-­‐description	  of	  reality),	  the	  ontological	  implications	  of	  metaphorical	  truth,	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  these	  findings	  for	  philosophical	  discourse	  in	  general	  and	  ontology	  in	  particular.	  	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  these	  differences,	  see	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor.	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experience	   X	   that	   entails	   unanswered	   semantic	   demands	   (X=?):	   she	   is	   unable	   to	  understand	   the	   experience	  on	   its	   own	   terms.	   	   She	   realizes	   there	   is	   a	   resemblance	  between	  X	  and	  Y,	  and	  thinks	  of	  X	  in	  terms	  of	  Y	  (X=Y).	  	  Through	  the	  heuristic	  device	  of	  Y,	  Jane	  is	  able	  to	  begin	  to	  understand	  the	  properties	  of	  X	  (X=Y	  entails	  a	  semantic	  gain).	   Next,	   through	   logical	   devices	   (namely,	   the	   principle	   identity	   and	   the	   law	   of	  non-­‐contradiction),	  X	  is	  analyzed	  and	  its	  own	  determinate	  qualities	  discerned.	  	  	  In	  other	  words,	  Ricoeur	  claims	  an	  experience	  that	  lacks	  explanation	  demands	  a	  concept	  that	  can	  resolve	  the	  semantic	  demand.	  	  In	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  he	  posits,	  “We	  might	  say	  then	  that	  the	  semantic	  shock	  produces	  a	  conceptual	  need,	  but	  not	  as	  yet	  any	  knowledge	  by	  means	  of	  concepts.”21	  	  Metaphor	  is	  employed	  to	  answer	  this	  need,	  providing	  a	  response	  to	  the	  semantic	  demand	  by	  way	  of	  a	  resemblance	  with	  a	  familiar	  phenomenon.	  Ricoeur	  writes,	  “New	  possibilities	  of	  signifying	  are	  opened	  up,	  supported	   by	   meanings	   that	   have	   already	   been	   established.” 22 	  	   These	   new	  possibilities,	  however,	  remain	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  poetic	  discourse,	  which	  is	  marked	  by	  an	  unregulated	  polysemy	  of	  meanings.	  In	  other	  words,	  meaning	  in	  poetic	  discourse	  is	  poly-­‐vocal	  and	  unregulated,	  i.e.	  marked	  by	  plurality	  and	  ambiguity.	  	  As	  such,	  this	  type	   of	   language	   is	   unsuitable	   for	   philosophical	   or	   scientific	   discourses,	   which	  require	  the	  consistency	  and	  stability	  of	  fixed	  concepts.	  	  At	   this	  point,	  according	   to	  Ricoeur,	  philosophical	  discourse	  applies	   its	   tools	  and	  techniques	  to	  the	  metaphorical	  disclosure,	  analyzing	  and	  critiquing	  its	  semantic	  gain.	  	  The	  metaphorical	  disclosure	  is	  submitted	  to	  the	  law	  of	  identity,	  and	  its	  unique	  and	   persisting	   qualities	   discerned	   and	   identified.	   	   This	   allows	   a	   stable	   and	   fixed	  concept,	  unique	  unto	  itself,	  to	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  vague	  and	  unregulated	  semantic	  gain	   of	   the	   metaphorical	   disclosure	   and	   employed	   in	   scientific	   or	   speculative	  discourses.	  	  	  Each	  of	  these	  more	  conceptually	  rigorous	  discourses	  has	  a	  different	  relation	  to	  metaphor	  befitting	  the	  object	  of	  its	  study.	   	  For	  example,	  the	  sciences	  can	  readily	  use	   metaphors	   as	   heuristic	   devices	   that,	   after	   appropriate	   refinement,	   can	  accurately	  disclose	  a	  physical	  state	  of	  affairs.	  	  As	  such,	  these	  “refined”	  metaphors	  are	  considered	  a	  legitimate	  and	  reliable	  aspect	  of	  scientific	  discourse.	  	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   speculative	   discourse	   and	   ontology	   have	   a	   unique	   and	  problematic	   relationship	   with	   metaphor	   that	   entails	   an	   ontological	   point	   of	   view	  that	   precludes	   Ricoeur	   from	   thinking	   metaphor	   in	   a	   manner	   consistent	   with	  Heidegger’s	   ontological	   project.23	  	   This	   ontological	   divergence	  will	   be	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  296	  	  22	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  298	  	  23	  Ricoeur	  characterizes	  speculative	  thought	  as	  the	  “discourse	  that	  establishes	  the	  primary	  notions,	  the	  principles,	  that	  articulate	  primordially	  the	  space	  of	  a	  concept.”	  (The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  300)	  In	  other	  words,	  speculative	  discourse	  is	  a	  meta-­‐conceptual	  discourse	  that	  establishes	  the	  relationships	  and	  limits	  of	  conceptual	  schemas.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  speculative	  thought	  lays	  the	  ground	  on	  which	  concepts	  are	  founded.	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To	  continue	  the	  previous	  example,	  we	  might	  say	  that,	  in	  a	  scientific	  discourse,	  Jane	   examines	   Y	   to	   elicit	   its	   unique	   qualities,	   which	   heretofore	   have	   remained	  undefined	  (Y=?).	  	  With	  the	  help	  of	  the	  law	  of	  identity,	  the	  character	  of	  Y	  is	  fixed,	  and	  Y	   becomes	   a	   stable,	   reliable	   concept	   (Y=Y).	   	   The	   use	   of	   a	   concept	   delineated	   and	  regulated	  in	  such	  a	  way	  is	  permissible	  within	  scientific	  discourse,	  unlike	  the	  vague	  and	  undefined	  semantic	  gain	  established	  through	  metaphor	  in	  poetic	  discourse.24	  Metaphor,	  for	  Ricoeur,	  has	  a	  privileged	  status;	  it	  is	  the	  linguistic	  mechanism	  by	   which	   pre-­‐linguistic	   meanings	   are	   conceptualized	   and	   enter	   into	   various	  discourses.	  	  Like	  Aristotle’s	  theory	  of	  metaphor,	  Ricoeur’s	  depends	  upon	  the	  notion	  of	   the	   disclosure	   of	   a	   previously	   unseen	   resemblance.	   	   This	   disclosure	   is	   initially	  pre-­‐linguistic:	   one	   has	   an	   experience	   that	   cannot	   be	   comprehended	   on	   its	   own	  terms.25	  	  This	  unexplainable	  experience	  is	  then	  “translated”	  by	  metaphor;	  that	  is,	  the	  semantic	  exigencies	  are	  satisfied	  through	  the	  metaphorical	  comparison.	   	  Thus,	  one	  employs	   a	   type	   of	   predication,	   in	   that	   it	   searches	   for	   some	   way	   to	   satisfy	   the	  semantic	  exigencies	  put	  forth	  by	  the	  unexplainable	  experience.	  	  	   For	  example,	  consider	  the	  metaphor	  “Achilles	  leapt	  on	  the	  foe	  as	  a	  lion.”26	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  this	  metaphor,	  we	  at	   least	  need	  to	  (1)	  know	  something	  about	  lions	  and	  	  (2)	  realize	  that	  some	  fact	  about	  lions	  is	  being	  used	  to	  describe	  Achilles.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  we	  need	  to	  know	  that	  lions	  are	  commonly	  thought	  to	  be	  fierce,	  powerful	  and	  aggressive;	  we	  then	  apply	  this	  knowledge	  as	  a	  type	  of	  predication	  of	  the	  person	  of	  Achilles,	  and	  we	  come	  to	  understand	  that	  Achilles	  leapt	  on	  the	  foe	  as	  a	  lion,	  in	  a	  fierce,	  powerful,	  aggressive	  manner.	  	  	  	   Predication	   is	   an	   important	   part	   of	   Ricoeur’s	   analysis	   of	   metaphor.	   	   If	   we	  understand	   “Achilles	   leapt	   on	   the	   foe	   as	   a	   lion”	   to	   be	   a	   metaphor,	   then	   we	  understand	   that	   “lion”	   is	   a	   predicates	   some	   quality	   of	   “Achilles.”	   As	   such,	   the	  metaphor	   compares	   two	   unlike	   things,	   drawing	   out	   a	   resemblance	   from	  heterogeneous	   realms.	   Predication	   serves	   to	   make	   this	   resemblance	   explicit,	  conjoining	  the	  two	  realms,	  and	  resulting	  in	  a	  semantic	  innovation,	  i.e.	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  meaning.	  	  This	  predication	  is	  of	  a	  peculiar	  kind,	  however;	  as	  a	  resemblance	  of	   two	   unlike	   things,	   it	   cannot	   be	   taken	   as	   a	   literal	   description	   of	   truth,	   strictly	  speaking.	   In	   a	  metaphor,	  we	   understand	   something	   only	   as	   something	   else	   (X=Y)	  Thus,	  it	  displays	  what	  Ricoeur	  calls	  metaphorical	  truth	  (being-­‐as),	  which	  he	  portrays	  as	  a	   simultaneous	  abiding	  of	   	   “being”	  and	   “not	  being.”	   	   It	   is	   through	   this	  notion	  of	  metaphorical	   truth	   that	   the	   difference	   between	   Ricoeur	   and	   Heidegger	   becomes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  See	  Ricoeur,	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  Study	  VII,	  #4	  “Model	  and	  Metaphor”	  for	  an	  extended	  discussion	  of	  the	  collusion	  of	  metaphor	  and	  models	  within	  scientific	  discourse.	  	  25Ricoeur	  characterizes	  this	  type	  of	  experience	  as	  a	  “semantic	  shock,”	  i.e.	  an	  experience	  the	  nature	  of	  which	  one	  lacks	  the	  words	  to	  adequately	  communicated.	  
The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  296	  	  26	  Aristotle,	  Rhetoric,	  1406b	  22-­‐24.	  	  This	  is	  a	  classic	  simile	  that	  resurfaces	  frequently	  throughout	  the	  literature	  on	  metaphor.	  	  (The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p	  24.	  	  Ricoeur	  contends	  that	  a	  simile	  is	  but	  a	  lengthened	  metaphor	  [248].	  	  There	  is	  some	  debate	  on	  this.)	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clearest.	   Metaphor,	   for	   Ricoeur,	   is	   this	   emergence	   of	   meaning	   through	   semantic	  innovation	  that	  satisfies	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  semantic	  exigencies	  of	  an	  unexplainable	  experience.	  	  	   In	  sum,	  Ricoeur’s	  metaphor	  allows	  a	  previously	  unseen	  resemblance	  to	  come	  to	   light	   through	   the	   juxtaposition	   of	   heterogeneous	   concepts.	   	   This	   just-­‐disclosed	  resemblance	   is	   a	   springboard	   that	   allows	   us	   to	   see	   other	   similarities	   and	  relationships,	   thus	  creating	  even	  more	  meaning.	   	  None	  of	   the	  semantic	   innovation	  disclosed	   by	   the	   metaphor	   is	   permissible	   within	   speculative	   discourse,	   however,	  until	  it	  has	  been	  submitted	  to	  the	  logical	  gaze	  of	  philosophy.	  	  Through	  the	  principle	  of	   identity	  and	   the	   law	  of	  non-­‐contradiction,	   the	  semantic	   innovation	   is	  examined,	  explored,	   and	   clarified;	   thus	   emerges	   a	   stable,	   fixed	   concept	   appropriate	   for	  speculative	  discourse.	  	  	  2.2	  Ontological	  Implications	  of	  Ricoeur’s	  Metaphor	  	   Ricoeur	   characterizes	   his	   theory	   of	   metaphor	   as	   a	   “tensional”	   theory,	  wherein	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  successful	  metaphor	  results	  from	  the	  interplay	  of	  various	  tensions	   within	   it.	   	   This	   tension	   occurs	   in	   three	   places:	   (1)	   within	   the	   statement	  (between	   tenor	   and	   vehicle,	   between	   focus	   and	   frame,	   between	   ordinary	   context	  and	   extraordinary	   context 27 ),	   (2)	   between	   two	   interpretations	   (literal	   and	  metaphorical),	   and	   (3)	  within	   the	   copula	   (between	   “identity	   and	  difference	   in	   the	  interplay	  of	  resemblance”).28	  	  Our	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  (3)	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  what	  Ricoeur	  terms	  “metaphorical	  truth”.	  	  	  	   When	   one	   encounters	   a	   successful	   metaphor,	   Ricoeur	   alleges,	   an	   unseen	  resemblance	   between	   two	   unlike	   things	   emerges	   and	   a	   new	   meaning	   (semantic	  innovation)	  is	  created.	  	  This	  semantic	  innovation	  depends	  upon	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  resemblance	  between	  two	  different	  elements	  –	  a	  difference	  that	  continues	  to	  persist	  alongside	  the	  resemblance.	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  the	  ontological	  status	  of	  the	  new	  meaning.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  “X=Y”,	  this	  has	  the	  strange	  consequence	  of	  implying	  an	   identity	   of	   unlike	   things	   which	   are	   understood	   by	   means	   of	   a	   resemblance.29	  	  	  Ricoeur	  calls	  this	  the	  “postulate	  of	  split	  reference.”30	  	  	  The	   “postulate	   of	   split	   reference”	   can	   be	   illustrated	   by	   distinguishing	  between	   the	   sense	   of	   identification	   and	  understanding.	   	   In	   a	   successful	  metaphor,	  one	  understands	  the	  semantic	  implications	  of	  “X=Y”	  while	  simultaneously	  oscillating	  between	   the	   ontological	   identifications	   “X	   is	   Y”	   and	   “X	   is	   not	   Y.”31	  	   When	   one	  understands	   a	   metaphor,	   one	   comprehends	   the	   semantic	   innovation,	   the	   new	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  This	  vocabulary	  (vehicle	  and	  tenor)	  was	  introduced	  by	  I.A.	  Richards.	  	  Tenor	  refers	  to	  the	  subject	  being	  described	  in	  the	  metaphor	  and	  vehicle	  refers	  to	  the	  subject	  whose	  attributes	  are	  borrowed.	  	  The	  other	  two	  sets	  of	  terms	  are	  different	  ways	  of	  naming	  this	  same	  relationship.	  See	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Rhetoric.	  	  28	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  247	  	  29	  Heiden,	  Gert-­‐Jan	  van	  der.	  	  The	  Truth	  (and	  Untruth)	  of	  Language,	  p.	  142-­‐144	  	  30	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  304	  	  31	  “Being	  as…	  means	  being	  and	  not	  being.”	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  297	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meaning	  that	  emerges.	  	  Identification,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  the	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  ontological	  tension	  entailed	  by	  a	  re-­‐description	  of	  X	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  resemblance	  with	   Y.	   	   A	  metaphorical	   truth,	   by	   virtue	   of	   its	   reliance	   upon	   the	   tension	   between	  metaphorical	  and	  literal	  interpretations,	  is	  understood	  in	  one	  manner	  (as	  a	  semantic	  innovation	   and	   emergence	   of	   meaning)	   and	   identified	   in	   another	   (as	   X	   and	   Y	  simultaneously).	   	   When	   one	   understands	   the	   meaning	   of	   “love	   is	   war”,	   one	   still	  identifies	  the	  difference	  between	  them.	  	  Thus,	  in	  the	  metaphor,	  love	  is	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  war,	  but	  still	  identified	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  distinct	  and	  different	  from	  war.	  	  Ricoeur	  alleges	  that	  metaphor	  re-­‐describes	  the	  world,	  and	  this	  re-­‐description	  has	  deep	  ontological	  consequences,	  as	  it	  affects	  our	  very	  understanding	  of	  the	  verb	  
to	  be.32	  	  	  For	  him,	  metaphor	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  rhetorical	  device,	  a	  simple	  play	  of	  words;	  it	   is	   the	   engine	   that	   drives	   the	   re-­‐description	   of	   reality	   and	   the	   discovery	   of	   the	  world.33	  	  It	  allows	  new	  meanings	  to	  emerge,	  expanding	  what	  we	  know	  and	  can	  say	  about	   the	   world.	   	   Ricoeur	   thus	   designates	   a	   successful	   metaphor	   as	   having	   the	  ontological	  status	  of	  “metaphorical	  truth”,	  wherein	  a	  statement	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  true	  and	  untrue	  at	   the	  same	  time.	   	   In	  other	  words,	   the	   truth	  of	  X	  becomes	  “being”	  and	   “not	   being”	   simultaneously.	   This	   tension	   is	   captured	   by	   Ricoeur’s	  characterization	   of	   poetic	   language	   as	   containing	   the	   senses	   of	   both	   “to	   discover”	  and	  “create”	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  In	  a	  successful	  metaphor,	  we	  simultaneously	  discover	  and	  create	  the	  world	  in	  which	  we	  live;	  the	  metaphorical	  disclosure	  has	  the	  character	  of	  both	  “being”	  and	  “not	  being.”34	  In	  discovering	  something	  that	  is	  already	  true,	  we	  also	  create	  or	  re-­‐describe	  reality.	  	  While	   Ricoeur	   posits	   metaphor	   as	   the	   engine	   that	   creates	   meaning	   within	  language,	   he	  qualifies	   and	  distinguishes	   its	   relationship	   to	   various	  discourses.	   	  He	  must	  do	  this,	  in	  fact,	  if	  he	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  metaphorical	  truth.	  	  For	  certain	  types	  of	  thought	  (such	  as	  poetic	  thought)	  metaphorical	  truth	  does	  not	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  its	  authority	  and	  validity.	  Poetry	  is	  not	  charged	  with	  describing	  the	  world	   in	   a	   philosophically	   rigorous	  manner.	   	   It	   is	   possible	   to	   learn	   about	   the	  world	   through	   poetry,	   Ricoeur	   claims,	   but	   the	   status	   of	   this	   knowledge	   is	   in	  question.	   	   It	   is	   of	   little	   consequence	   if	   a	   poet	   uses	   language	   in	   a	   strange	   and	  incomprehensible	  manner.	   	  However,	  for	  a	  discourse	  that	  aspires	  to	  truth	  (such	  as	  speculative	  thought)	  this	  poses	  a	  problem.35	  	  A	  philosopher	  may	  not	  employ	  vague,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  248	  	  33	  “The	  paradox	  of	  the	  poetic	  (language)	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  entirely	  in	  this,	  that	  the	  elevation	  of	  feeling	  to	  fiction	  is	  the	  condition	  of	  its	  mimetic	  use.	  	  Only	  a	  feeling	  transformed	  into	  myth	  can	  open	  up	  and	  discover	  the	  world.”	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  245.	  	  Also	  “It	  can	  be	  shown	  that…	  speculative	  discourse	  has	  its	  condition	  of	  
possibility	  in	  the	  semantic	  dynamism	  of	  metaphorical	  utterance.”	  Ibid.	  p.	  296	  (italics	  in	  the	  original)	  	  34	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  306	  	  35	  Ricoeur	  characterizes	  speculative	  thought	  as	  the	  “discourse	  that	  establishes	  the	  primary	  notions…that	  articulate	  primordially	  the	  space	  of	  a	  concept.”	  (The	  Rule	  of	  
Metaphor,	  p.300)	  Speculative	  thought	  “expresses	  the	  systematic	  character	  of	  the	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undefined,	   logically	  inconsistent	  concepts,	  according	  to	  Ricoeur,	  as	  this	  contradicts	  the	   principles	   that	   underlie	   and	   structure	   a	   philosophical	   investigation.	   As	   such,	  metaphorical/poetic	   language	  must	  be	   submitted	   to	   logical	   analysis	  before	   its	  use	  will	  be	  admitted	  into	  speculative	  discourse.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  broader	  arc	  of	  Ricoeur’s	  account	  of	  metaphor	  is	  beginning	  to	  become	  apparent.	   	  Metaphors	  respond	  to	  semantic	  exigencies,	  and	  the	  semantic	  innovation	   they	   entail	   becomes	   the	   fodder	   of	   speculative	   discourse,	   which	   uses	  philosophical-­‐logical	   techniques	   to	   clarify	   the	   semantic	   innovation,	   leading	   to	   a	  rigorous	  concept.	  	  There	  is	  a	  strict	  separation,	  then,	  between	  poetic	  and	  speculative	  discourse;	   the	  semantic	   innovation	  provided	  by	  poetic	   language	   is	  clarified	  via	  the	  logic	   and	   conceptual	   rigor	   of	   philosophical	   discourse. 36 	  Ricoeur	   claims	   that	  speculative	   discourse	   has	   its	   condition	   of	   possibility	   in	   poetic	   language,	   but	  speculative	   discourse	   nonetheless	   is	   a	   discourse	   unto	   itself.	   	   When	   the	   semantic	  innovation	   of	   poetic	   language	   is	   clarified,	   the	   resulting	   concept	   is	   lifted	   from	   the	  realm	  of	  poetic	  discourse	  and	  placed	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  speculative	  discourse,	  which	  Ricoeur	   defines	   as	   “another	   zone	   of	   meaning”	   that	   is	   “marked	   by	   an	   irreducible	  difference”	   from	   poetic	   discourse.37	  	   While	   poetic	   and	   speculative	   discourses	   are	  implicated	   with	   each	   other,	   Ricoeur	   posits	   a	   strict	   separation	   of	   the	   two,	   and	  submits	  the	  semantic	   innovation	  of	  poetic	   language	  to	  the	  eminence	  of	  speculative	  discourse	  and	  its	  conceptual	  rigor.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.3	  Ricoeur	  and	  Heidegger	  We	  are	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  analyze	  Ricoeur’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  status	  of	  the	  peculiar	  language	  of	  Heidegger’s	  text.	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  Ricoeur	  takes	  issue	  with	  Heidegger’s	  assertion	  that	  we	  are	  not	  to	  understand	  his	  texts	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  metaphor,	   alleging	   that	   the	   metaphorical	   power	   of	   Heidegger’s	   text	   significantly	  outweighs	  his	  instructions	  on	  how	  we	  are	  to	  read	  his	  text.	  	  	  Ricoeur	  takes	  the	  position	  that	  all	  philosophical	  thought	  necessarily	  engages	  in	  metaphysics	  and,	  as	  such,	   incorporates	  and	  utilizes	  one	  metaphor	  or	  another	  as	  its	  point	  of	  departure	  and	  principle	  of	  organization.38	  	  Metaphysical	   investigations	  employs	   metaphor	   in	   order	   to	   “draw	   out	   new	   meanings	   from	   some	   semantic	  impertinence	   and	   to	   bring	   to	   light	   new	   aspects	   of	   reality	   by	  means	   of	   a	   semantic	  innovation.”39	  	  Sometimes,	  this	  metaphor	  is	  transcendent	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  system	  of	  thought	  it	  supports,	  invisible	  to	  the	  conceptual	  network	  to	  which	  it	  gives	  birth.	  	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  conceptual…”	  thereby	  articulating	  the	  space	  in	  which	  a	  concept	  may	  legitimately	  operate.	  	  	  36	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  313	  	  37	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  296	  Ricoeur	  claims	  speculative	  discourse	  “has	  its	  necessity	  in	  itself.”	  	  	  38	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  288-­‐289,	  293-­‐295	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  this	  bears	  some	  similarities	  with	  Derrida’s	  analysis	  of	  metaphor.	  	  39	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  291	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any	   case,	   it	   opens	   up	   and	   directs	   possibilities	   of	   meaning	   within	   a	   particular	  movement	  of	  thought.	  	  Ricoeur	   treats	   Heidegger’s	   language	   in	   the	   same	   way,	   alleging	   that	   the	  peculiar	   phrasings	   we	   encounter	   in	   his	   text	   are	   merely	   word	   figures	   that	   create	  semantic	   exigencies	   that	   demand	   to	   be	   resolved.	   	   Thus,	   for	   example,	   when	  Heidegger	   writes,	   “Dasein	   is	   the	   clearing,”	   Ricoeur	   claims	   he	   is	   employing	   a	  metaphor	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  think	  the	  nature	  of	  human	  existence	  in	  a	  different	  set	  of	  conceptual	  relations	  than	  those	  entailed	  by	  the	  metaphor	  “man	  is	  a	  rational	  animal.”	  	  By	   characterizing	  Dasein	   as	   clearing,	   new	  ways	   to	   conceptualize	   the	  human	  being	  are	   opened	   up.	   In	   this	   way,	   he	   asserts	   metaphysics	   “seizes”	   the	   metaphorical	  process	   and	  makes	   it	  work	   to	   its	   advantage	   and	   extension.	   By	   profiting	   from	   this	  operation,	  Ricoeur	  alleges	  that	  Heidegger’s	  thought	  remains	  metaphysical.	  As	  to	  Heidegger’s	  claims	  to	  have	  escaped	  metaphysics,	  Ricoeur	  portrays	  this	  as	  pure	  hubris	  and	  self-­‐aggrandizement,	  remarking	  “The	  unity	  of	  ‘the’	  metaphysical	  is	  an	  after-­‐the-­‐fact	  construction	  of	  Heideggerian	  thought,	   intended	  to	  vindicate	  his	  own	   labor	  of	   thinking	  and	   to	   justify	   the	   renunciation	  of	   any	   thinking	   that	   is	  not	   a	  genuine	  overcoming	  of	  metaphysics.”	  40	  By	  characterizing	  his	  own	  thought	  as	  non-­‐metaphysical,	   Heidegger	   valorizes	   it	   and	   makes	   it	   seem	   exotic	   and	   unique,	   but	   -­‐according	   to	   Ricoeur-­‐	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   on	   which	   we	   ought	   to	   grant	   this	  exception.	  This	   follows	   from	  Ricoeur’s	   placement	   of	  Heidegger	  within	   the	   tradition	   of	  speculative	   thought	   inasmuch	   as	   Heidegger	   engaged	   in	   the	   project	   of	   pursuing	   a	  “new	  experience”	  through	  the	  means	  of	  “a	  new	  thinking	  and	  a	  new	  language.”41	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  from	  the	  discussion	  of	  Ricoeur’s	  view	  of	   the	  role	  of	  metaphor	   in	  the	  emergence	  of	  meaning	  in	  language,	  he	  posits	  metaphor	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  creation	  of	   linguistic	   meaning	   and	   concepts.	   	   Furthermore,	   Ricoeur	   locates	   Heidegger’s	  thought	  within	  this	  framework,	  against	  Heidegger’s	  request.	  So	  why	  should	  we	  read	  Heidegger	  any	  differently	   than	  does	  Ricoeur?	   	  Why	  should	   we	   simply	   take	   Heidegger	   at	   his	   word,	   blithely	   accepting	   his	   peculiar	  language	  as	  non-­‐metaphorical?	  	  On	  any	  quick	  reading,	  it	  certainly	  does	  appear	  that	  Heidegger	  is	  employing	  and	  profiting	  from	  metaphor	  in	  the	  manner	  Ricoeur	  alleges.	  	  	  To	   begin	   with,	   it	   would	   be	   intellectually	   dishonest	   not	   to	   first	   confront	   a	  thinker	   on	   the	   grounds	   they	   propose.	   To	   simply	   assume	   Heidegger	   is	   lying	   (for	  whatever	  reason)	  would	  be	   to	  close	  oneself	  off	   to	   the	  possibility	  of	  understanding	  the	   point	   he	   is	   trying	   to	   convey.	   	   In	   this	   case,	  Heidegger’s	   rejections	   of	  metaphor	  occur	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  attempts	  to	  think	  the	  pre-­‐linguistic	  essence	  of	  language	  and	  its	  relation	   to	   bodily	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	   and	   the	   originary	   openness	   to	   beings.	   	   For	  Heidegger,	  a	  sensible/intelligible	  opposition,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  implied	  by	  metaphor,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  311-­‐312.	  	  This	  claim	  seems	  a	  bit	  ambitious:	  it	  is	  unclear	  that	  Heidegger	  believed	  in	  the	  unity	  of	  metaphysics,	  i.e.	  as	  metaphysics	  as	  a	  single,	  undivided	  movement.	  	  It	  would	  be	  fair	  to	  claim,	  however,	  that	  metaphysics	  is	  unified	  for	  Heidegger	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  is	  consistently	  marked	  by	  concealment.	  	  	  41	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  311.	  	  One	  can	  detect	  a	  note	  of	  irony	  in	  Ricoeur’s	  tone	  here.	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does	  not	  mark	  the	  originary	  openness	  to	  beings;	  metaphor	  is	  therefore	  unfit	  to	  think	  this	  relation.	  But	   this	   thought	   unfolds	   through	   language	   that	   easily	   be	   interpreted	   as	  metaphorical,	   despite	   Heidegger’s	   explicit	   warning	   not	   to	   do	   so.	   	   However,	   to	  resolve	   the	   difficulty	   presented	   by	   Heidegger’s	   project	   by	   simply	   denying	   the	  possibility	   of	   a	   non-­‐metaphorical	   reading	   only	   serves	   to	   extinguish	   the	   line	   of	  thought	   before	   it	   is	   given	   a	   chance	   on	   its	   own	   terms;	   that	   is,	   it	   shuts	   down	   the	  possibility	  of	  thinking	  the	  extent	  and	  richness	  of	  Heidegger’s	  notion	  of	  bodily	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  and	  the	  originary	  openness	  to	  beings.	  	  Ricoeur	  applies	  his	  own	  notion	  of	  metaphor	   and	   its	   role	   in	   the	   emergence	   of	  meaning	   in	   language	   to	  Heidegger’s	  thought,	  thus	  precluding	  one	  from	  pursuing	  the	  actual	  project	  Heidegger	  is	  engaged	  in	  when	  rejecting	  metaphor,	  namely,	  an	  effort	  to	  rethink	  bodily	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   not	   structured	   by	   a	   sensible/intelligible	   opposition.	   	   When	   one	  posits	  metaphor	  as	  the	  fundamental	  mechanism	  that	  generates	  meaning,	  one	  tacitly	  imports	  this	  separation	  into	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  language.	  For	  Heidegger,	  this	  move	  is	  unacceptable	  if	  one	  wishes	  to	  think	  the	  essence	  of	  language	  and	  our	  relationship	  to	  it.	  	   This,	   however,	   is	   not	   to	   discredit	   the	   value	   of	   Ricoeur’s	   analysis.	   	   On	   the	  contrary,	   one	   could	   provide	   an	   argument	   as	   to	   how	   Heidegger	   might	   readily	  concede	  to	  metaphor	  in	  general	  the	  role	  Ricoeur	  attributes	  to	  it.	   	  But	  this	  is	  beside	  the	  point,	  for	  metaphor,	  embedded	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  sensible/intelligible	  opposition,	  is	  unfit	   to	   think	   primordially	   the	   relationship	   of	   bodily	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	   and	   the	  originary	  openness	  to	  beings.	  	  Heidegger	  is	  not	  interested	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  meaning	  solely	   within	   language,	   nor	   is	   he	   interested	   in	   the	   creation	   and	   clarification	   of	  concepts	  in	  speculative	  thought	  in	  the	  way	  Ricoeur	  is.42	  At	  the	  moments	  Heidegger	  makes	  his	  few	  explicit	  pronouncements	  on	  metaphor,	  he	  is	  engaged	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  think	   the	   essence	   of	   language	   and	   its	   relation	   to	   the	   “bodily	   articulation	   of	  language,”	   i.e.	   to	   the	   naming	   power	   of	   the	   word	   and	   its	   relation	   to	   the	   pre-­‐cognitive/pre-­‐linguistic	  originary	  disclosure	  of	  Dasein	  and	  its	  world.43	  	  The	  level	  of	  disclosure	   Heidegger	   hopes	   to	   think	   lies	   prior	   to	   the	   level	   of	   signification	   and	  
reference	  upon	  which	  the	  notion	  of	  metaphor	  depends.	  	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  inappropriate	  to	  subsume	   Heidegger’s	   thinking	   of	   the	   essence	   of	   language	   under	   the	   rubric	   of	  metaphor	  if	  one	  wants	  to	  be	  faithful	  to	  the	  intention	  of	  his	  thought.	  	   There	   are	   three	   significant	   features	   of	   Ricoeur’s	   analysis	   that	   Heidegger	  would	   claim	   preclude	   one	   from	   pursuing	   the	   task	   of	   thinking	   the	   essence	   of	  language.	   First,	   Ricoeur	   determines	   the	   truth	   disclosed	   by	   a	   metaphor	   as	  metaphorical	  truth:	  it	  is	  marked	  and	  catalyzed	  by	  the	  tension	  between	  “being”	  and	  “not	   being.”	   Heidegger,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   concerned	   with	   thinking	   aletheic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Ricoeur	  characterizes	  speculative	  thought	  as	  the	  “discourse	  that	  establishes	  the	  primary	  notions…that	  articulate	  primordially	  the	  space	  of	  a	  concept.”	  (The	  Rule	  of	  
Metaphor,	  p.300)	  	  In	  this	  way,	  he	  implies	  speculative	  thought	  underlies	  and	  founds	  conceptual	  thought.	  	  43	  Smith,	  Sounding/Silence,	  p.	  101-­‐102	  Smith	  compares	  the	  naming	  power	  of	  the	  word	  to	  the	  aletheic	  disclosure	  of	  the	  work	  of	  art.	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disclosure;	  that	  is,	  a	  disclosure	  of	  a	  being	  as	  it	  is,	  not	  as	  mediated	  in	  terms	  of	  another	  being.	   	   Second,	   Ricoeur	   asserts	   that	  metaphor	   is	   the	  mechanism	  driving	   semantic	  innovation.	  	  This	  semantic	  innovation	  occurs	  in	  a	  founded	  mode	  of	  being,	  not	  in	  the	  pre-­‐linguistic	   originary	   understanding	   that	   is	   the	   focus	   of	   Heidegger’s	   thought	   at	  this	   juncture.	   	   Third,	   Ricoeur	   proposes	   that	   the	   relationship	   between	   poetry	   and	  philosophy	   is	   hierarchical	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   semantic	   innovation	   disclosed	   by	  poetic	   language	   is	   submitted	   to	   the	   clarifying	   techniques	   and	   tools	   of	   logical	  discourse	   (principles	   of	   identity,	   non-­‐contradiction,	   etc.).	   	   Only	   after	   a	   semantic	  innovation	   has	   been	   vetted	   by	   philosophical	   techniques	   is	   it	   admissible	   into	  conceptual	   discourse.	   	   While	   conceptual	   discourse	   depends	   upon	   the	   poetic	  metaphor	  and	  speculative	   thought,	  metaphor	   serves	  only	  as	   the	   raw	  material	   that	  drives	  the	  creation	  of	  legitimate	  meanings.	  	  Thus,	  Ricoeur	  submits	  poetic	  thought	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  philosophical	  thought.	  	  	  This	  is	  different	  from	  Heidegger’s	  notion	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	   the	  poetry	  and	   thought,	  which	  he	  characterizes	  as	  a	   “co-­‐belonging”	  and	  “neighborly-­‐ness”.	  	  Thus,	  they	  are	  separate,	  but	  still	  joined	  together	  in	  an	  equiprimordial	  relationship	  of	  equal	  importance.44	  Of	   course,	   one	   could	   faithfully	   delve	   into	   Heidegger’s	   thought	   and	   still	  disagree	  with	  him;	  one	  could	  object	   that	  Ricoeur	  does	   this	  very	   thing,	   and	  merely	  has	  a	  different	  stance	  on	  metaphor	   than	  Heidegger	  does.	   	  But	  both	  Heidegger	  and	  Ricoeur	   want	   to	   think	   the	   opening	   up	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	   meaning;	   and,	   like	  Heidegger,	  Ricoeur	  claims	  that	  poetic	  speech	  is	  the	  bringing	  to	   language	  of	  a	  more	  primordial	  disclosure.45	  As	  Ricoeur	  writes	  “the	  speculative	  is	  what	  allows	  us	  to	  say	  that	   ‘to	   understand	   a	   (logical)	   expression	   is	   something	   other	   than	   ‘finding	  images’.”46	  With	   this,	   he	   indicates	   his	   awareness	   of	   the	   pre-­‐linguistic	   originary	  openness.	  	  But	  Ricoeur	  wavers	  on	  this	  point:	  he	  notes	  this	  pre-­‐linguistic	  realm,	  but	  nearly	  his	  entire	  analysis	  is	  guided	  by	  a	  linguistic-­‐semantic	  notion	  of	  metaphor	  that	  is	   thoroughly	  rooted	   in	   the	   founded	  mode	  of	  a	  sensible/intelligible	  opposition.	   	  As	  
such,	   he	   is	   barred	   from	   thinking	   the	   bodily	   articulation	   of	  meaning	   apart	   from	   this	  
opposition.	   	   As	  we	   shall	   see,	   this	   attempt	   is	   at	   the	   crux	  of	  Heidegger’s	   rejection	  of	  metaphor.	   	   For	  Ricoeur,	   language	   seems	   to	   be	   rooted	   in	   a	   pre-­‐linguistic	   originary	  disclosure,	  but	  he	  never	  focuses	  on	  this	  level,	  and	  his	  analysis	  remains	  embedded	  in	  the	   sensible/intelligible	   opposition	   and	   processes	   of	   signification	   and	   reference	  throughout.47	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  “The	  Nature	  of	  Language,”	  On	  the	  Way	  to	  Language,	  p.	  101:	  “Their	  neighborhood	  (of	  poetry	  and	  thought)	  did	  not	  come	  to	  them	  by	  chance…	  This	  is	  why	  we	  must	  experience	  them	  within,	  and	  in	  terms	  of,	  their	  neighborhood.”	  	  	  45	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  304	  “This	  knowledge	  is	  no	  longer	  intra-­‐linguistic	  but	  
extra-­‐linguistic;	  it	  moves	  from	  being	  to	  being-­‐said,	  at	  the	  very	  time	  that	  language	  itself	  moves	  from	  sense	  to	  reference.”	  (emphasis	  added)	  Shortly	  thereafter:	  “Something	  must	  be	  for	  something	  to	  be	  said.”	  	  46	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  301	  	  47	  It	  could	  be	  that	  Ricoeur’s	  concern	  with	  maintaining	  the	  univocity	  (or	  at	  least	  a	  regulated	  polyvocity)	  in	  philosophical	  discourse	  prevents	  him	  from	  pursuing	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   Heidegger,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  hopes	  to	  think	  the	  essence	  of	  language	  as	  it	  is	  apart	   from	   signification	   understood	   as	   an	   effect	   following	   from	   the	  sensible/intelligible	  opposition.	  This	  effort	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  reader	  encounters	   it	   in	   and	   through	   language,	   which	   tends	   to	   pull	   the	   reader	   toward	   a	  rhetorical-­‐linguistic	   interpretation	   of	   Heidegger’s	   language.	   As	   the	   subtitle	   of	  The	  
Rule	  of	  Metaphor	   indicates	  (multi-­‐disciplinary	  studies	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  meaning	  in	  language),	  Ricoeur’s	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  meaning	  in	  language,	  rather	  than	  on	  pre-­‐linguistic	  primordial	  disclosure,	  and	  he	  conceptualizes	  this	  disclosure	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  metaphor,	  preventing	  him	  from	  encountering	  Heidegger’s	  thought	  on	  its	  intended	  ground.	  Ricoeur	   characterizes	   metaphor	   as	   a	   heuristic	   device:	   it	   allows	   us	   to	  articulate	  a	  discovery	  of	  the	  world	  through	  the	  means	  of	  a	  resemblance.	   	  When	  we	  encounter	   a	   phenomenon	   we	   do	   not	   understand,	   we	   make	   sense	   of	   it	   through	   a	  resemblance	  to	  something	  we	  do	  understand.	  	  But	  by	  characterizing	  the	  emergence	  of	  meaning	   in	   this	  way,	   Ricoeur	   has	   imported	   the	   sensible/intelligible	   opposition	  into	  the	  core	  of	  his	  theory	  of	  language	  and	  our	  relationship	  to	  it.48	  	  Heidegger,	  on	  the	  other	   hand,	   hopes	   to	   think	   bodily	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	   in	   a	   manner	   prior	   to	   this	  
opposition.	  	  As	  his	  phenomenological	  analysis	  of	  hearing	  demonstrates,	   there	   is	  no	  fundamental	   opposition	   between	   sensibility	   and	   intelligibility:	   at	   the	   primordial	  level	   of	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	   they	   collapse	   into	   each	   other	   and	   cannot	   be	  distinguished.	   	  It	  is	  this	  primordial	  level	  of	  phenomenality	  that	  Heidegger	  hopes	  to	  think,	   and	  we	   are	   barred	   from	   it	   at	   the	   outset	   if	   we	   think	   of	   language	   only	   from	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  metaphor	  or	  another	  such	  sensible/intelligible	  opposition.	  	  	   We	  have	  seen,	  then,	  that	  to	   interpret	  Heidegger’s	   language	  as	  metaphorical,	  while	  an	  understandable	  move,	  blocks	  Ricoeur	  from	  confronting	  Heidegger’s	  project	  (thinking	   the	   essence	   of	   language)	   on	   its	   own	   terms.	   	   Furthermore,	   thinking	   the	  essence	   of	   language	   from	   the	   standpoint	   of	  metaphor	   (as	   does	   Ricoeur)	   prevents	  one	   from	  addressing	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  pre-­‐	  or	  extra-­‐linguistic	  notion	  of	   language	  and	  gaining	  a	  richer	  understanding	  of	  Heidegger’s	  text.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Heidegger’s	  suggestion;	  he	  suggests	  that	  he	  takes	  issue	  with	  Heidegger’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  poetic	  qualities	  of	  thought.	  See	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  p.	  311.	  	  	  	  48	  In	  other	  words,	  he	  claims	  we	  first	  have	  a	  sensible	  experience	  that	  we	  subsequently	  make	  intelligible	  to	  ourselves	  via	  recourse	  to	  metaphor.	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CHAPTER	  3:	  DERRIDA	  
	  	   Derrida	   approaches	   the	   question	   of	   Heidegger’s	   relationship	   to	   metaphor	  during	   the	   course	   of	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   implication	   of	   metaphor	   in	   philosophical	  discourse.	   	   Unlike	   Ricoeur,	  who	  will	   place	  metaphor	   in	   the	   service	   of	   philosophy,	  Derrida	   sees	  within	   philosophy	   an	   inherent	  metaphoricity	   that	   can	   never	   be	   fully	  exorcised	   or	   controlled.	   This	   intrinsic	   metaphoricity,	   however,	   also	   forms	   the	  condition	   of	   possibility	   of	   philosophical	   discourse,	   inasmuch	   as	   it	   founds	   and	  sustains	   a	   conceptual	   system.	   Through	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   limitations	   of	   the	  philosophical	   concept	   of	   metaphor,	   Derrida	   intends	   to	   illustrate	   philosophy’s	  inability	   to	   master	   the	   metaphoricity	   of	   its	   own	   texts,	   thus	   implying	   the	  impossibility	  of	  a	  transparent	  and	  “proper”	  philosophical	  language.	  	  	   As	  we	  shall	  see,	  Derrida’s	  reading	  of	  Heidegger	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  connection	  he	   posits	   between	   philosophy	   and	   metaphor. 49 	  By	   claiming	   philosophy	   (and	  language)	   is	   inherently	  metaphorical,	   he	   is	   compelled	   to	   characterize	   Heidegger’s	  peculiar	  language	  as	  quasi-­‐metaphorical;	  he	  locates	  it	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  withdrawal	  of	   being.	   In	   other	   words,	   although	   language	   is	   denied	   the	   possibility	   of	   naming	  being,	  it	  can	  trace	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  being	  through	  the	  analogous	  movement	  of	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  metaphor	  in	  a	  philosophical	  text.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  Derrida	  ties	  Heidegger’s	  rejection	   of	   metaphor	   to	   the	   metaphorical	   displacement	   that	   occurs	   when	  metaphysics	  attempts	  to	  name	  being	  as	  a	  being.	  	  While	  an	  intriguing	  notion	  in	  itself,	  this	  reading	  ignores	  the	  context	  in	  which	  Heidegger’s	  rejection	  of	  metaphor	  occurs:	  that	   is,	  within	  an	  attempt	  to	  think	  the	  relation	  of	   the	  originary	  openness	  to	  beings	  and	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  This	  skews	  the	  direction	  of	  Derrida’s	  reading	  of	  Heidegger’s	  language	  away	  from	  the	  direction	  Heidegger	  intended.	   	  Addressing	  this	  divergence	  helps	  us	  to	  place	  Heidegger’s	  rejection	  of	  metaphor	  in	  a	  context	  wherein	  his	  peculiar	  language	  can	  be	  thought	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  project	  he	  is	  pursuing.	  	  Derrida	  discusses	  metaphor	  in	  two	  texts:	  “White	  Mythology”	  and	  “The	  Retrait	  of	   Metaphor.”	   In	   “White	   Mythology”,	   he	   addresses	   the	   relationship	   between	  metaphor	  and	  philosophy;	   in	  “The	  Retrait	  of	  Metaphor,”	  he	  focuses	  on	  Heidegger’s	  relationship	   to	   metaphor.	   	   A	   discussion	   of	   Derrida’s	   view	   of	   the	   implication	   of	  metaphor	   in	   philosophy	   will	   serve	   as	   the	   point	   of	   departure	   from	  which	   we	   can	  contextualize	   his	   claims	   regarding	   the	   quasi-­‐metaphorical	   status	   of	   Heidegger’s	  language.	   	  The	  divergence	  between	  Heidegger	  and	  Derrida’s	  accounts	  of	  metaphor	  will	   then	   be	   clear.	   	   Although	   Derrida’s	   reading	   of	   Heidegger’s	   language	   is	   more	  faithful	  to	  Heidegger’s	  project	  than	  is	  Ricoeur’s	  analysis,	  he	  also	  fails	  to	  address	  the	  context	  in	  which	  Heidegger	  rejects	  metaphor,	  and	  thus	  fails	  to	  grasp	  the	  full	  import	  of	  Heidegger’s	  peculiar	  language.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Derrida	  claims	  all	  language	  and	  philosophy	  is	  permeated	  with	  metaphor,	  writing,	  “What	  is	  going	  on	  with	  metaphor?	  	  Well,	  everything:	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  does	  not	  go	  on	  with	  metaphor	  and	  through	  metaphor.”	  (“The	  Retrait	  of	  Metaphor,”	  Psyche,	  p.	  50,	  italics	  in	  the	  original)	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3.1	  Derrida,	  Metaphor,	  and	  Philosophy	  In	   “White	   Mythology,”	   Derrida	   addresses	   the	   complex	   and	   problematic	  relationship	   between	   philosophy	   and	  metaphor.	   	   Traditionally,	   philosophers	   have	  treated	   metaphor	   to	   a	   systematic	   philosophical	   conceptualization,	   often	  emphasizing	   metaphor’s	   disclosive	   capacity	   but	   simultaneously	   assimilating	   it	  within	  a	  regulated,	  controlled,	  univocal	  philosophical	  discourse.	   	  In	  these	  accounts,	  metaphor	  serves	  as	  the	  engine	  that	  drives	  the	  creation	  of	  stable,	  legitimate	  concepts.	  	  This,	   in	   fact,	   is	   precisely	   how	   Ricoeur	   treats	   metaphor	   in	   The	   Rule	   of	   Metaphor.	  	  Derrida	   questions	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   this	   operation,	   contending	   it	   reverses	   the	  priority	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  metaphor	  and	  philosophy,	  thereby	  condemning	  philosophy	   to	   a	   “blind	   spot	   or	   a	   certain	   deafness”	   regarding	   the	   inherent	  metaphoricity	   of	   its	   own	   texts. 50 	  If	   philosophy	   is	   unable	   to	   identify	   and	  conceptualize	  the	  functioning	  of	  its	  own	  metaphors,	  it	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  present	  itself	  as	  an	  intellectual	  rigorous	  discourse	  with	  a	  legitimate	  claim	  to	  truth.	  	  	  	   Derrida	  begins	  by	  analyzing	  a	  common	  account	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  metaphor	  and	  philosophy.51	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  philosophical	  concepts	  arise	  by	  way	  of	  a	  sensible	  experience	  that	  is	  made	  intelligible	  and	  conceptualized	  by	  way	  of	  metaphor.	  These	  concepts	  then	  enter	  into	  common	  usage.	  	  Over	  time,	  however,	  their	  metaphorical	  origin	   is	   forgotten;	   in	  this	   forgotten-­‐ness,	   they	  crystallize	   into	  ready-­‐made	   concepts	   taken	   to	   represent	   abstract	   and	   universal	   ideas.	   Conceptual	  abstractions,	   so	   the	   theory	   goes,	   always	  hide	   a	   sensible	   figure	   at	   their	   center	   that	  animates	   them,	   giving	   their	   form	   and	   organizing	   their	  movement.52	  	   This	   sensible	  figure	  becomes	  effaced	  and	  withdraws	  over	  time,	  its	  metaphorical	  nature	  forgotten,	  but	   the	   effacement	   (forgetting)	   of	   the	  metaphorical	   origin	   results	   in	   a	   conceptual	  gain.	  	   Nietzsche,	   writing	   in	   the	   traditional	   vein,	   claims,	   “What,	   then,	   is	   truth?	   A	  mobile	  army	  of	  metaphors,	  metonyms,	  and	  anthropomorphisms…	  a	  sum	  of	  human	  relations	   that	   have	   been	   embellished…	   and	   which	   after	   a	   long	   time	   seem	   firm,	  canonical,	  and	  obligatory	  to	  a	  people…”53	  Elsewhere	  in	  this	  essay,	  Nietzsche	  asserts	  that	  truths	  begin	  with	  a	  sensible	  experience,	  to	  which	  is	  then	  attached	  a	  word.	  	  This	  word,	   which	   is	   intended	   to	   represent	   a	   “unique	   and	   wholly	   individualized	  experience,”	   gradually	   loses	   its	   unique	   qualities,	   as	   it	   is	   used	   to	   denote	   similar	  phenomena.	   	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   original	   experience	   becomes	  marred	   and	   lost	   from	  view.	   	  Consider	  a	   leaf,	   for	  example.	   	  We	  designate	  many	  different	  objects	  with	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  “White	  Mythology,”	  Margins,	  p.	  228	  This	  position	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  Derrida	  or	  deconstruction;	  it	  is	  also	  the	  point	  of	  view	  assumed	  by	  Max	  Black	  in	  his	  essay	  “Metaphor”	  (1958).	  	  Black	  concludes	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  derive	  a	  concept	  of	  metaphor	  that	  will	  enable	  one	  to	  consistently	  identify	  metaphors	  in	  a	  text.	  	  51	  Derrida	  analyzes	  Anatole	  France’s	  The	  Garden	  of	  Epicurus	  as	  well	  as	  Nietzsche’s	  “Truth	  and	  Lies	  in	  an	  Extra-­‐Moral	  Sense”;	  both	  texts	  propose	  this	  general	  account	  of	  metaphor	  and	  truth.	  	  52	  “White	  Mythology,”	  Margins,	  p.	  210	  	  53	  “On	  Truth	  and	  Lies	  in	  an	  Extra-­‐Moral	  Sense,”	  The	  Portable	  Nietzsche,	  p.	  46-­‐47	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word	  “leaf,”	  not	  only	  leaves	  of	  different	  species	  of	  tree,	  but	  also	  individual	  leaves	  of	  the	   same	   species.	   	   The	   word	   “leaf,”	   then,	   abstracts	   from	   a	   unique	   and	   individual	  sense	   experience	   to	   a	   generalized	   concept	   that	   lacks	   the	   luster	   of	   the	   original	  experience.	  Nietzsche	  identifies	  a	  metaphorical	  operation	  in	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  original	   sensible	   experience,	   inasmuch	   as	   the	   word	   is	   taken	   to	   speak	   truly	   of	   the	  
original	  experience,	  which	   it	  of	  course	  cannot	  do.	   	   “Truths	  are	   illusions,”	  he	  writes,	  “about	   which	   one	   has	   forgotten	   that	   this	   is	   what	   they	   are;	   metaphors	   which	   are	  worn	  out	  and	  without	  sensuous	  power;	  coins	  which	  have	  lost	  their	  pictures	  and	  now	  matter	   only	   as	   metal,	   no	   longer	   as	   coins.”54 	  When	   the	   sensible	   experience	   is	  transferred	   into	   intelligible	   meaning,	   Nietzsche	   identifies	   this	   transfer	   as	  metaphorical	  in	  nature.	  	  	   Let	   us	   review	   this	   account	   of	   metaphor	   in	   greater	   detail.	   	   Metaphysical	  concepts,	   it	  alleges,	   	   (1)	  begin	  as	  a	  sensible,	  physical	  disclosure;	  (2)	   this	  particular	  sensible	   disclosure	   is	   given	   a	   name;	   (3)	   the	   name,	   through	   repeated	   use,	   is	  colloquialized	   and	   turned	   into	   a	   concept;	   (4)	   this	   conceptualization	   becomes	   an	  intelligible	   abstraction	   divorced	   from	   the	   sensible	   experience	   of	   the	   original	  disclosure.	   	   This	   is	   a	   common	   critique	   of	   the	   presence	   and	   work	   of	   metaphor	   in	  philosophy,	  and	  it	  serves	  as	  Derrida’s	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  his	  analysis	   in	  “White	  Mythology.”	  	   The	  traditional	  manner	  of	  addressing	  the	  subject	  of	  metaphor	  in	  philosophy	  is	   to	   propose	   a	   theory	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   metaphor:	   this	   theory	   would	   contain	   a	  mechanics	   of	   metaphor,	   describe	   its	   relationship	   to	   philosophy	   (a	   hierarchical	  relationship	   that	   submits	   metaphor	   to	   philosophical	   eminence),	   and	   establish	   a	  manner	   of	   distinguishing	   valid	   or	   fruitful	   metaphors	   from	   bad	   or	   harmful	  metaphors.	   	  In	  this	  way,	  philosophy	  would	  produce	  a	  well-­‐defined,	  limited	  concept	  of	  metaphor	  that	  it	  could	  utilize	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  its	  own	  ends,	  namely	  the	  pursuit	  of	  truth.	   	   This	   theory	   of	   metaphor	   could	   then	   be	   used	   to	   analyze	   the	   metaphors	  animating	   various	   philosophies,	   illustrating	   how	   they	   shape	   and	   control	   the	  movement	   of	   a	   given	   discourse.	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   work	   of	   metaphor	   could	   be	  separated	   out	   from	   philosophy	   proper,	   its	   effects	   being	   thoroughly	   known	   and	  regulated;	  the	  integrity	  of	  philosophical	  discourse	  could	  then	  be	  maintained.	  Derrida	   offers	   the	   philosophical	   metaphor	   of	   the	   sun,	   or	   “heliotropic	  metaphors,”	  as	  he	  calls	  them,	  as	  an	  example.	  	  Philosophical	  metaphors	  are	  caught	  in	  a	   circle:	   they	   are	   selected	   by	   a	   tacit	   philosophy,	   but	   they	   also	   give	   rise	   to	   a	  conceptual	  network	  that	  serves	  to	  express	  this	  philosophy.	  In	  this	  way,	  a	  particular	  philosophy	   provides	   the	   metaphors	   by	   which	   it	   organizes	   itself.55	  	   For	   example,	  Derrida	   claims	   the	   sun	   is	   often	   employed	   as	   a	   philosophical	   metaphor	   because	  “natural	  light…	  is	  never	  subject	  to	  the	  most	  radical	  doubt.”56	  Since	  light	  illuminates	  our	  world	  and	  allows	  us	  to	  see,	  it	  is	  sometimes	  taken	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	  truth.	  	  In	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  On	  Truth	  and	  Lies	  in	  an	  Extra-­‐Moral	  Sense,	  p.	  47	  	  55	  Derrida	  calls	  this	  “the	  circle	  of	  the	  heliotrope;”	  see	  “White	  Mythology,”	  Margins,	  p.	  266.	  	  56	  “White	  Mythology,”	  Margins,	  p.	  267	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way,	  the	  notion	  of	  light	  organizes	  the	  unfolding	  of	  some	  philosophies.	  	  Descartes,	  for	  example,	  employs	  the	  notion	  natural	  light	  as	  his	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  introducing	  clear	   and	   distinct	   ideas,	   which	   frees	   him	   from	   the	   threat	   of	   insurmountable	  hyperbolic	   doubt.57	  Derrida	   claims	   the	  metaphor	   of	   light	   structures	   and	   organizes	  the	  unfolding	  of	  Descartes	  philosophy.	  In	   a	   manner	   that	   both	   performs	   and	   critiques	   this	   common	   account	   of	  metaphor,	   Derrida	   proposes	   we	   understand	   traditional	   conceptualizations	   of	  metaphor	  through	  the	  economic	  notion	  of	  usury.	   	  Usury,	  he	  alleges,	  nicely	  sums	  up	  the	  logic	  underlying	  traditional	  accounts	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  metaphor.	  These	  accounts	  hinge	  on	  the	  notions	  of	  profit	  and	  loss:	  profit,	  for	  the	  semantic	  innovation	  supplied	  by	   the	   metaphor,	   and	   loss	   for	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   metaphor.58	  Derrida	   selects	   the	  notion	  of	  usury	  because	  it	  implies	  the	  notions	  of	  both	  profit	  and	  loss,	  capturing	  the	  two	  most	  prominent	  features	  of	  metaphor.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  he	  notes	  that	  usury	  is	  itself	   a	   “metaphor	   for	  metaphor”;	   that	   is,	   it	   is	   a	  metaphor	   that	   conceptualizes	   and	  explains	  how	  metaphors	  function	  in	  a	  text.59	  	  In	  other	  words,	  Derrida	  locates	  within	  the	   traditional	   account	  of	  metaphor	   an	   economic	  metaphor	   (that	   of	   usury)	   that	   is	  used	  to	  draw	  out	  and	  explain	  the	  work	  of	  metaphor	  in	  philosophy.	  	  	  Usury,	  he	  writes,	  is	  an	  economic	  term	  that	  implies	  notions	  of	  loss	  and	  profit.	  	  The	   traditional	   account	   of	   metaphor	   (which	   is	   sometimes	   explained	   in	   terms	   of	  coinage	   and	  money,	  making	  Derrida’s	   choice	   of	  usury	  even	  more	   appropriate;	   see	  Nietzsche’s	  Truth	  and	  Lies	  in	  an	  Extra-­‐Moral	  Sense	   as	  well	   as	  Anatole	  France’s	  The	  
Garden	   of	   Epicurus)	   posits	   both	   of	   these	   movements	   in	   metaphor:	   metaphor	  discloses	   the	   world	   in	   new	  ways,	   implying	   the	   surplus	   value	   of	   a	   profit,	   and	   the	  conceptualization	  and	  subsequent	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  metaphor	  entails	  a	  certain	  loss.	  	  Metaphor,	   as	   a	   traditional	   account	   goes,	   entails	   a	   conceptual	   gain	   (profit);	   this	  conceptual	   gain	   implies	   a	   withdrawal	   (loss)	   of	   its	   metaphorical	   quality	   as	   it	   is	  crystallized	  from	  the	  original	  sense	  experience	  into	  an	  intelligible	  concept.	  	  Thus,	  the	  economic	  schema	  of	  usury	  is	  a	  keen	  metaphor	  that	  reveals	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	  the	  traditional	  account	  of	  metaphor,	  which	  implies	  both	  of	  these	  aspects	  of	  metaphor.	  	  Initially,	  a	  reader	  might	  believe	  Derrida	  is	  enacting	  the	  very	  movement	  he	  is	  criticizing,	   i.e.	   that	   he	   is	   analyzing	   and	   determining	   the	   action	   of	   metaphor	   in	  philosophical	   discourse	   by	   recourse	   to	   yet	   another	   metaphor	   (the	   metaphor	   of	  usury)	  the	  presence	  of	  which	  he	  is	  not	  aware	  of	  in	  his	  discourse.	  	  But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  
case;	  Derrida	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  paradoxical	  nature	  of	  his	  analysis.	  	  But	  he	  pursues	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Descartes	  mentions	  natural	  light	  in	  the	  third,	  fourth,	  and	  fifth	  Meditations,	  all	  in	  relation	  to	  questions	  of	  knowledge	  and	  certainty.	  	  For	  an	  interesting	  analysis	  of	  the	  role	  of	  light	  in	  Meditations,	  see	  Daniel,	  “Descartes	  Treatment	  of	  ‘lumen	  naturale’,”	  
Studentia	  Leibnitiana,	  1978	  p.	  92-­‐100.	  	  58	  By	  withdrawal	  of	  metaphor,	  we	  mean	  the	  tendency	  for	  common	  metaphors	  to	  become	  colloquialized,	  or	  to	  pass	  by	  unnoticed	  in	  a	  text	  or	  in	  speech.	  	  This	  aspect	  of	  metaphoricity,	  attributed	  to	  dead	  metaphor,	  frequently	  recurs	  in	  discussions	  of	  metaphor.	  Derrida	  sometimes	  calls	  this	  “effacement.”	  	  	  59“White	  Mythology,”	  Margins,	  p.	  265	  “Text”	  should	  be	  understood	  here	  in	  a	  wide	  sense.	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strategy	  in	  order	  to	  illustrate	  a	  larger	  point:	  theories	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  metaphor	  are	  
always	  animated	  by	  yet	  another	  metaphor	  that	  structures	  and	  sustains	  the	  unfolding	  of	   the	   theory.	   	   In	   this	   way,	   traditional	   concepts	   of	   metaphor	   merely	   repeat	   the	  phenomenon	  they	  intend	  to	  explain;	  as	  such,	  they	  fail	  to	  adequately	  define	  a	  concept	  of	   metaphor.	   Derrida	   alleges	   this	   refolding	   of	   metaphoricity	   is	   endemic	   to	   the	  structure	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   metaphor	   and	   cannot	   be	   overcome,	   remarking,	   “the	  metaphorization	   of	   metaphor,	   its	   bottomless	   overdeterminability,	   seems	   to	   be	  inscribed	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  metaphor,	  but	  as	  its	  negativity.”60	  Derrida	   does	   not	   propose	   the	   notion	   of	   usury	   as	   the	   ultimate	  conceptualization	   of	   metaphor;	   rather,	   he	   is	   drawing	   attention	   to	   a	   common	  
metaphor	   of	   metaphor	   that	   has	   frequently	   animated	   and	   organized	   theories	   of	  metaphor	   throughout	   history.	   Moreover,	   these	   theories	   have	   been	   claimed	   to	  accurately	  and	  fully	  describe	  the	  workings	  of	  metaphor,	  but	  Derrida	  hopes	  to	  point	  out	  the	  circular	  nature	  of	  these	  definitions.	  	  If	  we	  must	  resort	  to	  metaphor	  in	  order	  to	  describe	  the	  inner	  mechanics	  of	  metaphor,	  then,	  he	  claims,	  we	  will	  never	  arrive	  at	  a	  final	  and	  absolute	  concept	  of	  metaphor.	  	  Instead,	  we	  will	  be	  confined	  to	  positing	  an	  endless	   chain	   of	   metaphors	   of	   metaphor.	   This	   state	   of	   affairs	   may	   be	   fine	   with	  Derrida,	  but	  it	  conflicts	  with	  the	  intentions	  of	  those	  who	  would	  propose	  a	  concept	  of	  metaphor,	   as	   it	   conflicts	   with	   their	   ultimate	   intention	   of	   strictly	   defining	   what	   a	  metaphor	  is	  and	  how	  it	  works.61	  	  	  	  	  Rather	   than	   blithely	   continue	   this	   tradition,	   Derrida	   wants	   to	   identify	   the	  historic	   terrain	   on	   which	   the	   discussion	   of	   metaphor	   in	   philosophy	   occurred	   in	  order	  to	  better	  determine	  its	  underlying	  assumptions	  and	  conditions	  of	  possibility.	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   he	   is	   not	   criticizing	   the	   efficacy	   of	   this	   notion	   of	  metaphor,	   only	   pointing	   out	   the	   assumptions	   and	   limitations	   entailed	   by	   such	   an	  account.	  Thus	  he	  is	  not	  guilty	  of	  offering	  us	  yet	  another	  analysis	  of	  metaphor	  made	  possible	  by	  a	  metaphoric	  detour.62	  According	   to	   Derrida,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   categorically	   define	   and	   fix	   the	  concept	   of	   metaphor	   within	   philosophical	   discourse,	   because	   philosophy	   itself	   is	  
permeated	  by	  metaphoricity.63	  While	  one	  can	  propose	  various	  accounts	  of	  metaphor,	  Derrida	  claims	  each	  of	  these	  will	  be	  founded	  upon	  a	  metaphor	  which	  structures	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  “White	  Mythology,”	  Margins,	  p.	  243	  	  61	  In	  regard	  to	  establishing	  a	  strictly	  delineated	  concept	  of	  metaphor,	  he	  remarks	  “Let	  us	  rather	  attempt	  to	  recognize	  in	  principle	  the	  condition	  for	  the	  impossibility	  of	  such	  a	  project.”	  (italics	  in	  the	  original)	  And	  shortly	  thereafter	  “(Metaphor)	  cannot	  dominate	  itself…Therefore	  it	  gets	  ‘carried	  away’	  each	  time	  one	  of	  its	  products	  –	  here,	  the	  concept	  of	  metaphor	  –	  attempts	  to	  include	  under	  its	  own	  law	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  field	  to	  which	  it	  belongs.”	  “White	  Mythology,”	  Margins,	  p.	  219	  	  62	  “White	  Mythology,”	  Margins,	  p.	  219	  	  63	  Derrida	  alleges	  that	  metaphoricity	  permeates	  all	  arenas	  of	  thought,	  writing	  “Any	  statement	  concerning	  anything	  whatsoever	  that	  goes	  on,	  metaphor	  included,	  will	  not	  have	  been	  produced	  without	  metaphor.”	  (“The	  Retrait	  of	  Metaphor,”	  Psyche,	  p.	  50)	  As	  we	  can	  see	  from	  this	  claim,	  Derrida	  assigns	  a	  wide	  role	  to	  metaphor.	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organizes	  the	  movement	  of	  its	  discourse;	  this	  structural	  metaphor	  will	  be	  invisible	  to	   the	  account	   it	  sustains.64	  	   If	  one	  offers	  a	  concept	  of	  metaphor,	   it	  will	  depend	  on	  and	   profit	   from	   an	   unseen	  metaphor	   that	   animates	   it.	   A	   theory	   of	   this	   kind,	   that	  attempts	   to	   define	   and	   regulate	   metaphor	   within	   philosophical	   discourse,	   will	  always	   exclude	   its	   own	   organizing	   and	   transcendent	   metaphor.	   	   At	   least	   one	  metaphor	  will	   always	  be	  excluded	  and	  effaced,	  and	   it	   is	   from	  this	  exclusion	   that	  a	  surplus	   conceptual	   profit	   is	   extracted.65	  According	   to	   Derrida,	   this	   transcendent,	  organizing	  metaphor	   is	   not	   itself	   visible;	   it	   is	   only	   perceptible	   through	   “a	   certain	  deafness,”	  a	  “blind	  spot”	  it	  generates.	  Metaphor,	   according	   to	  Derrida,	   enables,	   sustains,	   reproduces,	   and	   extends	  the	  conceptual	  network	  that	  implies	  a	  particular	  philosophy;	  but	  this	  philosophy	  is	  itself	  embedded	  in	  the	  selection	  of	  metaphors	  suitable	  for	  it.	  Derrida	  writes,	  “What	  is	  defined,	  therefore,	  is	  implied	  in	  the	  defining	  of	  the	  definition.”66	  It	  is	  important	  to	  keep	   in	  mind,	  however,	   that	   this	  sustaining	  metaphor	  remains,	   to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  hidden	  from	  this	  discourse.	  	  As	  such,	  philosophy	  is	  structurally	  prevented	  from	  both	  producing	  a	  fully	  regulated,	  transparent	  concept	  of	  metaphor	  and	  exorcizing	  its	  own	  metaphoricity.	  	  For	  Derrida,	  this	  structural	  blind	  spot	  implies	  a	  disarticulation	  of	  the	  metaphysical	  opposition	  of	  the	  proper/improper	  as	  well	  as	  what	  he	  will	  call	  in	  “The	  Retrait	  of	  Metaphor,”	  the	  quasi-­‐metaphorical	  structure	  of	  metaphysics	  in	  which	  the	  folded,	  twisted	  structure	  of	  metaphysics	  and	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  being	  are	  traced	  by	  the	  displacing	  “re-­‐trait”	  of	  metaphor.	   	  Ultimately,	  he	  will	  read	  Heidegger’s	  peculiar	  language	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  “quasi-­‐metaphoricity.”	  	  3.2	  Quasi-­‐Metaphoricity	  and	  the	  Retrait	  In	  “The	  Retrait	  of	  Metaphor”,	  Derrida	  approaches	  the	  question	  of	  metaphor	  through	  the	  notion	  of	  withdrawal,	  articulating	  what	  van	  der	  Heiden	  calls	  the	  “logic	  of	  the	  retrait/re-­‐trait.”67	  	  According	  to	  this	  logic,	  being	  itself	  can	  never	  be	  disclosed,	  strictly	   speaking;	   instead,	   a	   supplementary	   trait	   serves	   to	   disclose	   only	   the	  
withdrawal	  of	  being.	   	  Derrida	  claims	   the	  qualities	  of	  withdrawal	  and	  displacement	  entailed	  by	  metaphor	  mirror	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  being	  that	  Heidegger	  regards	  as	  the	  hallmark	   of	   metaphysics,	   thereby	  motivating	   Heidegger’s	   rejection	   of	   the	   concept	  metaphor.	   	  Heidegger’s	   rejection	   of	  metaphoricity	  would	   then	   open	  up	   a	   space	   in	  which	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  being	  can	  be	  thought.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Derrida	  remarks	  that	  a	  philosophical	  concept	  of	  metaphor	  implies	  “a	  philosophical	  discourse	  whose	  entire	  surface	  is	  worked	  by	  a	  metaphorics.”	  “White	  Mythology,”	  Margins,	  p.	  232	  	  65	  Derrida	  writes	  “Always	  one	  more	  metaphor	  when	  metaphor	  withdraws/is	  retraced	  in	  opening	  out	  its	  limits.”	  “The	  Retrait	  of	  Metaphor,”	  Psyche,	  p.	  71	  	  66	  “White	  Mythology,”	  Margins,	  p.	  230	  	  67	  The	  Truth	  (and	  Untruth)	  of	  Language,	  p.	  176	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Let	  us	  analyze	  this	  claim	  in	  further	  detail.68	  Heidegger,	  in	  the	  few	  moments	  in	  which	   he	   explicitly	   refers	   to	   and	   discusses	  metaphor,	   consistently	   claims	   that	   the	  metaphorical	   exists	   only	  within	   the	  metaphysical.	   	  Derrida	   reads	   this	   claim	   in	   the	  following	  way:	   since	   being	   is	   not	   a	   being	   among	   beings,	   it	   cannot	   be	   named	   in	   a	  literal	   or	   proper	   way,	   as	   this	   would	   immediately	   determine	   it	   as	   a	   being	   among	  beings,	  obliterating	  the	  ontological	  difference	  that	  is	  integral	  to	  Heidegger’s	  thought.	  	  As	   such,	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   being	   can	   be	   thought	   only	   through	   a	  metaphorical	   or	  
metonymical	  displacement,	  wherein	  being	  is	  given	  a	  name.	  	  In	  this	  naming,	  however,	  being	   withdraws,	   replaced	   by	   a	   reference	   to	   beings.	   The	   withdrawal	   of	   being	   is	  mirrored,	  according	  to	  Derrida,	  by	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  metaphoricity	  that	  correlates	  with	  its	  conceptualization.	  	  	  The	   withdrawal	   of	   metaphoricity,	   however,	   would	   not	   entail	   a	   return	   to	   a	  “proper”	   origin	   that	   names	   being	   literally.	   	   On	   the	   contrary,	   it	  would	   signal	  what	  Derrida	  calls	  a	  “refolding,”	  a	  repetition	  of	  the	  supplementary	  trait	  of	  metaphor	  that	  traces	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  being.	  	  Since	  being	  cannot	  be	  properly	  named,	  we	  can	  only	  think	   its	   withdrawal,	   and	   this	   withdrawal	   is	   traced,	   first	   by	   the	   displacement	   of	  being	   with	   beings,	   and	   then	   by	   the	   effacement	   of	   the	   metaphor’s	   metaphoricity.	  	  Metaphor	  remains,	  unnoticed,	  and	  likewise	  being	  remains	  undisclosed.	   	  Ultimately,	  in	   this	   account,	   both	   the	  withdrawal	   of	   being	   as	  well	   as	   the	   concept	   of	  metaphor	  would	   be	   thought	   metaphysically.	   	   Since	   the	   being	   of	   beings	   cannot	   be	   properly	  named,	   any	   name	   given	   to	   it	   has	   a	   metaphorical	   –	   and	   therefore	   metaphysical	   -­‐	  provenance.	   	   In	   this	   sense,	   metaphor	   does	   not	   give	   anything	   to	   think	   on	   being;	  rather,	  it	  only	  gives	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  being.	  	  As	  such,	  thinking	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  being	  as	  well	  as	  of	  metaphor	  is	  possible	  only	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  thinking	  the	  ontic-­‐ontological	  difference.	  Typically,	  a	  metaphor	  will	  use	  a	  well-­‐known	  thing	  to	  explicate	  an	  unknown	  or	  unfamiliar	  thing.	  	  Derrida,	  however,	  claims	  that	  quasi-­‐metaphoricity	  reverses	  the	  usual	   direction	   of	   the	   metaphor.69	  	   In	   quasi-­‐metaphoricity,	   a	   well-­‐known	   thing	   is	  rendered	   unfamiliar,	   opening	   up	   a	   space	   for	   the	   thought	   to	   come.	   	   Consider,	   for	  example,	   the	   phrase	   “language	   is	   the	   house	   of	   being.”	   Contained	   within	   the	  instruction	  not	  to	  understand	  the	  phrase	  metaphorically,	  Heidegger	  writes	  that	  we	  are	   not	   to	   interpret	   this	   phrase	   as	   implying	   a	   transfer	   of	   the	   image	   of	   the	   word	  “house”	  to	  “being.”	  Instead,	  he	  claims,	  contemplating	  the	  essence	  of	  being	  will,	  in	  the	  future,	   give	   the	   possibility	   of	   thinking	  what	   “house”	   and	   “to	   dwell”	   are.70	  In	   other	  words,	  Heidegger	   instructs	  us	   to	   reverse	   the	  direction	  of	   the	   interpretation	  of	   the	  phrase.	   	  Instead	  of	  using	  the	  commonplace	  notion	  of	  house	  to	  better	  think	  the	  less	  well-­‐known	   (to	   say	   the	   least)	   thought	   of	   being,	   the	   thinking	   of	   being	  will	   help	   us	  think	   the	   essence	   of	   “house”	   and	   “to	   dwell.”	   But	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	  thinking	   of	   being	  will	   not	   clarify	   any	   beings	   in	   particular	   –	   it	   will	   not	   result	   in	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  The	  following	  two	  paragraphs	  are	  drawn	  from	  “The	  Retrait	  of	  Metaphor,”	  Psyche,	  p.	  65-­‐68.	  	  69	  “The	  Retrait	  of	  Metaphor,”	  Psyche,	  p.	  69	  	  70	  “Letter	  on	  Humanism,”	  Basic	  Writings,	  p.	  260	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disclosure	  of	  new	  knowledge	  on	  the	  level	  of	  beings.	  	  Rather,	  it	  will	  point	  toward	  the	  unthought	  in	  thought,	  i.e.	  to	  the	  essence	  of	  thought	  as	  “to	  come.”	  According	   to	   Derrida,	   quasi-­‐metaphoricity	   allows	   Heidegger	   to	   think	   the	  logic	   of	   metaphysics	   by	   allowing	   him	   to	   think	   the	   forgetting	   and	   withdrawal	   of	  being.	  	  The	  reversal	  of	  the	  direction	  of	  metaphor	  indicates	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  being	  and	   gestures	   toward	   the	   essence	   of	   thought.	   But	   Derrida	   claims	   that	   quasi-­‐metaphoricity	   is	   “no	   longer	   simply	  metaphoric.”71	  Instead,	   it	   states	   the	   non-­‐literal	  condition	  of	  metaphoricity,	   that	   is,	   the	  re-­‐folding	  of	  being	   that	  makes	  metaphysics	  possible.	  	   The	   logic	  of	   the	  retrait	   is	  a	  common	   line	  of	   thinking	   in	  Derrida’s	  works.	   	   In	  “Différance”	  he	  writes,	  “Since	  the	  trace	  (trait)	  is	  not	  a	  presence	  but	  the	  simulacrum	  of	   a	   presence	   that	   dislocates	   itself,	   refers	   itself,	   it	   properly	   has	   no	   site	   –	   erasure	  belongs	  to	  its	  structure”	  and	  shortly	  thereafter,	  “Thereby	  the	  text	  of	  metaphysics	  is	  comprehended.”72	  According	   to	   Derrida,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   name	   being,	   precisely	  because	  “there	  is	  no	  name	  for	  it	  at	  all.”73	  Since	  being	  is	  not	  a	  being	  among	  beings,	  it	  cannot	  appear	  –	  it	  is	  “structurally	  in	  withdrawal”	  and	  the	  writing	  of	  it	  succeeds	  in	  its	  intention	   only	   insofar	   as	   it	   traces	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   being.74 	  The	   retrait,	   like	  
différance,	   is	  nothing	  but	   the	   trace	  of	   the	  unfolding	  of	   the	  ontological	  difference,	  a	  perpetual	  deferral	  and	  differing	  of	  presence.	  	  3.3	  Derrida	  and	  Heidegger	  	   Derrida	   is	   one	   of	   the	   few	   to	   take	   seriously	   Heidegger’s	   instruction	   not	   to	  understand	  his	  language	  as	  metaphorical,	  as	  a	  mere	  transferal	  of	  image.	  	  Even	  still,	  Derrida	  struggles	  with	  this	  directive,	  ultimately	  characterizing	  Heidegger’s	  peculiar	  language	  as	  quasi-­‐metaphorical;	  that	  is,	  he	  claims	  it	  is	  neither	  literal	  nor	  figurative,	  but	  exhibits	  a	  re-­‐folding	  of	  language	  that	  mirrors	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  being	  and	  allows	  us	  to	  think	  this	  withdrawal.	  	  Thus,	  Derrida	  locates	  his	  notion	  of	  quasi-­‐metaphoricity	  within	  a	  framework	  of	  difference	  and	  deferral	  that	  he	  claims	  characterizes	  language	  and	  metaphysics.	   	  While	   intriguing	   in	   its	  own	  right,	   this	  perspective	  conflicts	  with	  that	   of	  Heidegger’s,	  who	  hopes	   not	   to	   think	   the	   disclosure	   of	   language	   only	   as	   an	  endless	   chain	   of	   linguistic	   substitutions,	   but	   as	   unconcealing,	   pre-­‐linguistic,	  originary	  disclosure.	  	  	  	   Both	  Derrida	  and	  Heidegger	  are	  concerned	  with	  thinking	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  being	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  engages	  in	  a	  play	  of	  concealedness	  and	  unconcealedness.	  	  But	  they	  have	  different	  views	  that	  shape	  the	  tenor	  of	  this	  thinking.	   	  Heidegger,	  broadly	  speaking,	  hopes	  the	  essence	  of	  concealment	  and	  withdrawal	  of	  being	  can	  be	  brought	  into	   unconcealment	   through	   disclosive	   saying.	   Derrida,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   claims	  the	   withdrawal	   of	   being	   can	   never	   be,	   strictly	   speaking,	   brought	   into	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  “The	  Retrait	  of	  Metaphor,”	  Psyche,	  p.	  70.	  And	  shortly	  thereafter,	  “Despite	  its	  resemblance	  or	  its	  movement,	  this	  phrasing	  is	  no	  longer	  proper	  or	  literal.”	  	  72	  “Différance,”	  Margins,	  p.	  24	  	  73	  “Différance,”	  Margins,	  p.	  26	  	  74	  “The	  Retrait	  of	  Metaphor,”	  Psyche,	  p.	  75	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unconcealment/presence;	   instead,	   only	   the	  withdrawal	   itself	   can	   be	   thought,	   and	  this	   only	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   supplement	   that	   merely	   traces	   the	   withdrawal.	  	  Furthermore,	   on	   his	   view,	   metaphor	   permeates	   language:	   nothing	   in	   language	  happens	   without	   metaphor. 75 	  As	   such,	   Derrida	   cannot	   help	   but	   diverge	   from	  Heidegger	  on	   the	   issue	  of	  metaphor,	   as	   their	   views	  on	   language	   and	   its	   limits	   are	  fundamentally	   different.	   Whereas	   metaphor	   plays	   a	   substantial	   role	   in	   Derrida’s	  notion	  of	  language,	  Heidegger	  cannot	  have	  any	  traces	  of	  metaphor	  in	  his	  thinking	  of	  being,	   as	   this	   would	   imply	   the	   disclosure	   of	   a	   semblance.76	  Derrida	   will	   privilege	  displacement	   in	   his	   account	   of	   language,	   while	   Heidegger	   will	   privilege	   the	  possibility	  of	  an	  unconcealing	  disclosure.	  	  These	  viewpoints	  are	  distinctly	  different.	  	   In	  any	  case,	  Derrida’s	  proclivity	  for	  emphasizing	  the	  effects	  of	  displacement	  within	  a	  text	  precludes	  him	  from	  fully	  committing	  to	  Heidegger’s	  instruction	  not	  to	  read	  his	  peculiar	  language	  as	  merely	  metaphorical.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  his	  reading	  of	  quasi-­‐metaphoricity	  is	  a	  half	  measure	  that	  fails	  to	  address	  the	  core	  of	  Heidegger’s	  project.	  	  Let’s	  further	  explore	  this	  claim.	  	   In	   the	   interest	   of	   a	   charitable	   reading	   of	   Derrida’s	   interpretation,	   it	   is	   not	  clear	   that	   Heidegger	   would	   reject	   all	   aspects	   of	   Derrida’s	   notion	   of	   quasi-­‐metaphoricity	  entirely;	  he	  certainly	  would	  agree	  with	  the	  impossibility	  of	  a	  (proper	  or	   final)	   naming	   of	   being	   as	   well	   as	   the	   metaphorico-­‐metonymical	   displacement	  effected	   by	  metaphysical	   theories.	   	  But	  he	  would	   stridently	  disagree	  with	  Derrida’s	  
retention	   of	   any	  metaphoricity	   in	   the	   characterization	   of	   his	   own	   language.	   	   As	   we	  shall	   see,	   the	  majority	   of	  Heidegger’s	   infrequent	   remarks	   on	  metaphor	   take	   place	  during	  larger	  discussions	  in	  which	  Heidegger	  hopes	  to	  think	  the	  essence	  of	  language	  and	   its	   relation	   to	   the	   bodily	   articulation	   of	   speech,	   not	   the	   metaphorico-­‐metonymical	  displacement	  of	  being.	  	   It	   is	   odd	   that	   Derrida	   retains	   of	   any	   type	   of	   metaphoricity	   in	   his	   effort	   to	  understand	   Heidegger’s	   rejection	   of	   metaphor,	   as	   this	   raises	   the	   question	   of	   the	  justification	  for	  this	  interpretive	  violence.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  quasi-­‐metaphoricity,	  as	  a	  supplement	   that	   traces	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   being,	   would	   merely	   serve	   to	   conceal	  being;	   as	   such,	   it	   conflicts	   with	   Heidegger’s	   larger	   project,	   i.e.	   to	   think	   the	  unconcealment	   of	   being	   as	   aletheia.	   For	   Heidegger,	   there	   can	   be	   no	   vestige	   of	  metaphor	  in	  thinking	  the	  essence	  of	  language,	  as	  this	  would	  determine	  it	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  semblance	  and	  concealment.	  	  	   Derrida	  contends	  that	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  reject	  metaphor	  per	  se,	  but	  rather	  
the	  traditional	  concept	  of	  metaphor.	  By	  rejecting	  the	  concept	  of	  metaphor,	  Heidegger	  opens	  a	  space	  in	  which	  other	  traits	  of	  metaphoricity	  emerge,	  namely,	  the	  retrait	  of	  metaphor	   (quasi-­‐metaphoricity).	   Quasi-­‐metaphoricity	   then	   allows	   us	   to	   think	   the	  withdrawal	   of	   being	   and	   its	   relationship	   to	   metaphysics,	   language,	   and	   truth,	  through	  the	  analogous	  movement	  of	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  metaphor.	  Derrida	  contends	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  “The	  Retrait	  of	  Metaphor,”	  Psyche,	  p.	  50	  	  76	  In	  regards	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  Derrida	  and	  Heidegger	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  metaphor,	  Kockelmans	  wryly	  comments,	  “If	  (Heidegger)	  had	  shared	  the	  views	  of	  Derrida	  and	  Ricoeur,	  he	  would	  have	  devoted	  an	  entire	  lecture	  course	  to	  the	  problems	  involved.”	  	  Heidegger:	  Critical	  Assessements,	  vol.	  3,	  p.	  294	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that	   by	   withdrawing	   the	   concept	   of	   metaphor,	   Heidegger’s	   language	   becomes	  uncanny	   and	   strange,	   compelling	   us	   to	   attempt	   to	   think	   the	   essence	   of	   language.	  Unlike	  traditional	  metaphor,	  which	  familiarizes	  the	  unfamiliar,	  quasi-­‐metaphoricity	  distances	   that	   which	   is	   near	   and	   familiar	   (the	   common	   meanings	   of	   words).77	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  gestures	  toward	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  relationship	  to	  language.	  Thus,	  while	  Derrida	  acknowledges	  it	  would	  be	  misleading	  to	  read	  Heidegger’s	  text	  as	  employing	  metaphor	   traditionally	   construed,	   he	   also	   consistently	   maintains	   Heidegger	   is	  engaging	  in	  some	  type	  of	  metaphoricity,	  albeit	  one	  that	  mirrors,	  and	  thereby	  reveals,	  the	  refolded	  structure	  of	  metaphysics.	  	  	  	   The	  substantive	  difference,	  then,	  between	  Heidegger’s	  own	  understanding	  of	  his	  rejection	  of	  metaphor	  and	  Derrida’s	  reading	  of	  it	  lies	  in	  the	  contextualization	  of	  the	   rejection.	   While	   Heidegger	   acknowledges	   the	   necessary	   co-­‐implication	   of	  concealment	  and	  unconcealment,	  he	  hopes	  to	  think	  this	  co-­‐implication	  as	  a	  letting-­‐be	  of	  beings.	  This	  is	  illustrated	  in	  his	  phenomenological	  analysis	  of	  hearing	  and	  his	  thinking	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  bodily	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  and	  originary	  openness	  to	  beings.	  	  Derrida,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  sees	  the	  unfolding	  of	  language	  as	  dependent	  on	  the	  deferral	  and	  displacement	  of	  différance	  that	  characterizes	  language.	  	  As	  such,	  metaphor	   (as	   deferring	   displacement)	   is	   a	   necessary	   and	   inevitable	   part	   of	   all	  language.	  This	  view	  forces	  him	  to	  read	  Heidegger’s	  language	  as	  quasi-­‐metaphorical,	  a	  reading	  that	  conflicts	  with	  Heidegger’s	  hope	  to	  think	  disclosure	  as	  aletheia.	  	  	  The	   difference	   between	   aletheia	   and	   différance	   gestures	   toward	   the	  divergence	   of	   Derrida	   and	   Heidegger	   regarding	   the	   nature	   of	   disclosure	   and	  language.	   For	   Derrida,	   meaning	   is	   an	   effect	   of	   the	   differing	   and	   deferring	   play	   of	  
différance,	  which	  stems	  from	  the	  intrinsic	  supplementarity	  of	  language.	  	  In	  the	  same	  way,	   quasi-­‐metaphoricity	   is	   also	   marked	   by	   the	   addition	   of	   a	   supplement	   that	  results	  in	  perpetual	  postponement.	  	  	  	   Heidegger,	   however,	   has	   a	   different	   view	   on	   language:	   he	   hopes	   to	   bring	  language	   to	   language	   as	   language,	   thus	   making	   it	   possible	   for	   us	   to	   undergo	   “an	  experience	   with	   language.”78 	  In	   other	   words,	   he	   hopes	   to	   think	   the	   originary	  openness	   to	  beings	   that	   he	   links	   to	   the	  distinctive	  human	   capacity	   for	   language.79	  	  Furthermore,	   he	   hopes	   to	   think	   bodily	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	   in	   relation	   to	   this	  originary	  openness	  to	  beings.	  This	  effort	  is	  further	  complicated	  when	  one	  notes	  that	  it	  takes	  place	  in	  language:	  this	  is	  what	  Heidegger	  means	  by	  “to	  speak	  about	  speech	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  “The	  Retrait	  of	  Metaphor,”	  Psyche,	  p.	  69	  	  78	  “The	  Nature	  of	  Language,”	  On	  the	  Way	  to	  Language,	  p.	  57	  	  79	  For	  Heidegger,	  only	  humans	  have	  the	  capacity	  for	  language.	  Animals	  can	  communicate	  in	  various	  ways,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  have	  language;	  they	  cannot	  speak.	  	  By	  portraying	  the	  human	  relationship	  to	  language	  in	  this	  way,	  Heidegger	  is	  trying	  to	  underscore	  the	  human	  being’s	  openness	  to	  beings.	  	  That	  is,	  human	  beings	  are	  the	  beings	  who	  can	  surpass	  beings,	  i.e.	  are	  not	  held	  captive	  or	  transfixed	  by	  beings.	  	  For	  Heidegger,	  this	  capacity	  to	  surpass	  beings	  distinguishes	  Dasein	  (and	  its	  relationship	  to	  being)	  from	  animals.	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qua	  speech.”80	  	  Heidegger	  hopes	  to	  bring	  language	  as	  such	  to	  presence,	  to	  bring	  the	  experience	  of	  language	  to	  language.81	  	   The	   preceding	   claim	   indicates	   the	   richness	   and	   complexity	   of	   Heidegger’s	  thought	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   language	   and	   pre-­‐reflective	   originary	  understanding,	   a	   line	   of	   questioning	   that	   can	  be	   traced	  back	   to	   his	   earliest	  works	  through	  his	  phenomenological	  analyses	  of	  hearing.82	  It	  is	  in	  this	  line	  of	  thinking	  that	  most	  of	  Heidegger’s	  references	  to	  metaphor	  occur.	   	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  more	  appropriate	  to	  locate	  his	  rejection	  of	  metaphor	  within	  his	  re-­‐thinking	  of	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  and	  the	   bodily	   articulation	   of	   speech	   as	   it	   relates	   to	   a	   pre-­‐cognitive,	   pre-­‐linguistic	  originary	  understanding.	   	  It	  is	  during	  the	  course	  of	  this	  re-­‐thinking	  of	  body,	  sound,	  and	  sense	  that	  Heidegger	  rejects	  metaphor,	  as	  employing	  it	  would	  portray	  language	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  founded	  on	  the	  sensible/intelligible	  opposition.	  Derrida’s	  notion	  of	   quasi-­‐metaphoricity	   obscures	   this	   line	   of	   thought	   by	   casting	   it	   in	   the	   linguistic	  framework	  of	  the	  metaphorico-­‐metonymical	  displacement	  of	  being.	  	  By	  re-­‐injecting	  	  metaphor	   into	   Heidegger’s	   thought,	   we	   are	   turned	   away	   from	   thinking	   the	  relationship	   of	   originary	   openness	   to	   beings,	   bodily	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	   and	  language	  that	  Heidegger	  hopes	  to	  think.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  “The	  Way	  to	  Language,”	  On	  the	  Way	  to	  Language,	  p.	  113	  	  81	  “The	  Nature	  of	  Language,”	  On	  the	  Way	  to	  Language,	  p.	  59	  	  82	  For	  example,	  see	  History	  of	  the	  Concept	  of	  Time,	  sec.	  28-­‐d:	  “Discourse	  and	  Language.”	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CHAPTER	  4:	  HEIDEGGER	  
	  Heidegger’s	   views	   on	  metaphor	   and	   its	   relation	   to	   the	   essence	   of	   language	  are,	  admittedly,	  a	  little	  startling	  at	  first.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  reader	  is	  exposed	  to	  a	  text	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  rife	  with	  metaphorical	  or	  figurative	  meanings,	  phrases	  such	  as	   “language	   is	   the	   house	   of	   being,”	   “language	   is	   the	   flower	   of	   the	   mouth,”	   or	  “thinking	   is	   a	   seeing	   and	   a	   hearing.”	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   however,	   Heidegger	  instructs	  the	  reader	  to	  take	  care	  not	  to	  read	  these	  phrases	  as	  metaphors.	  	  	  	   This	   paradox	   is	   mitigated,	   though,	   when	   one	   takes	   into	   account	   what	  Heidegger	  hopes	  to	  achieve	  in	  his	  rethinking	  of	  language.	  	  Language,	  for	  Heidegger,	  is	  extended	  to	  include	  more	  than	  mere	  words,	  understood	  as	  a	  set	  of	  verbal	  symbols.	  	  Language,	  in	  this	  broad	  sense,	  extends	  to	  include	  non-­‐verbal	  elements,	  for	  example,	  a	   wink,	   gesture,	   or	   vocal	   inflection	   and	   intonation.	   	   This	   line	   of	   thought	  problematizes	   a	   correspondence	  model	  of	   language	  and	   suggests	   a	  direction	   for	   a	  fundamental	  rethinking	  of	  language	  and	  our	  relation	  to	  it,	  one	  that	  is	  not	  delimited	  by	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  sign	  relation.	  	   As	  we	   shall	   see,	  Heidegger’s	  most	   extensive	  discussions	   of	  metaphor	   occur	  within	   this	   context,	   namely,	   a	   rethinking	   of	   our	   bodily	   experience.	   The	  sensible/intelligible	   opposition	   that	   metaphor	   entails	   precludes	   the	   possibility	   of	  thinking	  the	  originary	  openness	  to	  beings	  that	  makes	  language	  possible	  in	  the	  first	  place.	   Specifically,	  Heidegger’s	   concern	   is	   twofold:	   he	   hopes	   to	   think	   (1)	   language	  
apart	  from	   the	  sensible/intelligible	  opposition	  and	  (2)	  and	   the	  originary	  openness	  that	   makes	   language	   possible.	   Metaphor,	   in	   his	   view,	   implies	   a	   framework	  structured	   by	   the	   sensible/intelligible	   opposition,	   and	   thus	   is	   inappropriate	   for	   a	  thinking	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  language.	  	   This	  will	  become	  clear	  through	  an	  analysis	  of	  Heidegger’s	  view	  of	  the	  nature	  of	   language,	  dasein’s	  originary	  openness	   to	  beings,	   and	   the	   coming	   to	  presence	  of	  beings	   within	   the	   open.	   This	   will	   provide	   a	   background	   in	   which	   we	   may	  contextualize	   his	   rejection	   of	  metaphor	   and	   situate	   his	   peculiar	   language.	   Finally,	  this	   will	   enable	   us	   to	   grasp	   the	   depth	   of	   difference	   between	   the	   approaches	   of	  Ricoeur,	  Derrida,	  and	  Heidegger.	  
	  4.1	  Heidegger	  and	  Language	  	   As	  noted	  above,	  Heidegger’s	  concern	   in	  his	   thinking	  of	   language	   is	   twofold:	  he	  wants	  to	  (1)	  think	  language	  in	  a	  manner	  more	  fundamental	  than	  the	  one	  entailed	  by	   the	   sign	   relation	   framework,	   and	   (2)	   think	   the	   originary	   openness	   that	  makes	  language	  possible.	  	  Words,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  standardized	  units	  of	  verbal	  meaning,	  play	  a	  derivative	  role	  in	  his	  thinking	  of	  language.	  	  Heidegger	  wants	  to	  think	  what	  makes	  it	  possible	   to	   speak	   in	   the	   first	  place,	   and	   this	  he	  attributes	   to	   a	  particular	   sort	  of	  openness	  to	  beings.83	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  By	  “speaking”	  Heidegger	  has	  a	  somewhat	  specialized	  meaning	  in	  mind.	  	  Rather	  than	  the	  rote	  use	  of	  verbal	  units	  (what	  Heidegger	  might	  call	  “employing”	  language),	  speaking	  implies	  a	  bringing	  to	  presence	  of	  beings	  that	  opens	  up	  a	  world.	  It	  is	  a	  type	  of	  speaking	  that	  Heidegger	  characterizes	  as	  poetic	  language.	  This	  capacity	  for	  
	   30	  
	   In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  we	  cannot	  rely	  traditional	  notions	  of	   language;	  we	  need	  “the	   right	   concept	   of	   language.”84 	  According	   to	   Heidegger,	   language	   has	   been	  traditionally	  understood	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  sign	  relation.	  	  “Letters	  are	  the	  signs	  of	  sounds,	   the	  sounds	  are	   the	  signs	  of	  mental	  experiences,	  and	  these	  are	   the	  signs	   of	   things.	   The	   sign	   relation	   constitutes	   the	   struts	   of	   the	   structure.”85	  But	   for	  Heidegger,	   language	   is	   not	   primarily	   about	   sign	   relations.	   Nor	   is	   language	   to	   be	  viewed	  merely	  as	  a	  set	  of	  words	  (for	  example,	  those	  found	  in	  the	  dictionary).	  	  If	  we	  think	   of	   language	   only	   in	   these	   terms,	   Heidegger	   contends	   that	   we	   have	   not	   yet	  experienced	  “the	  real	  nature	  of	  sounds	  and	  tones	  of	  speech.”86	  Instead,	  language	  is	  a	  “showing”:	   it	   “makes	   something	   come	   to	   light,	   lets	   what	   has	   come	   to	   light	   to	   be	  perceived,	  and	  lets	  the	  perception	  be	  examined.”87	  	  According	  to	  Heidegger,	  the	  way	  language	  “shows”	  has	  been	  hijacked	  and	  monopolized	  by	  the	  sign	  relation.	  	  Because	  language	   shows,	   it	   has	   been	   understood	   to	   show	   in	   the	   same	   way	   that	   the	   sign	  relation	   does;	   but	   Heidegger	   claims	   this	   relation	   does	   not	   speak	   to	   the	   essence	   of	  
language.	  	  	   We	  can	  already	  see,	  then,	  that	  Heidegger’s	  view	  of	  language	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  that	  taken	  by	  what	  is	  commonly	  understood	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  language.	  	  His	  project	   is	  oriented	  in	  a	  totally	  different	  direction.	   	  While	  philosophy	  of	   language	  is	  concerned	   with	   the	   nature	   of	   linguistic	   meaning,	   the	   use	   of	   language,	   the	  relationship	   of	   language	   and	   reality,	   etc.,	   Heidegger	   hopes	   to	   think	   what	   makes	  language	  possible,	   i.e.	  about	  the	  human	  beings	  relationship	  to	   language	  at	   its	  most	  fundamental	  level.	  	  Metaphor,	  as	  it	  implies	  a	  view	  of	  language	  structured	  by	  the	  sign	  relation,	   simply	   impedes	   this	   attempt;	   it	   is	   unable	   to	   disclose	   the	   essence	   of	  language.	  	  All	  philosophical	  concepts	  of	  metaphor	  arise	  from	  a	  rhetorical,	  semantic,	  or	   hermeneutic	   perspective;	   these	   all	   depend	   upon	   a	   view	   of	   language	  fundamentally	  structured	  by	  the	  sign	  relation.	  	  As	  such,	  metaphor	  prevents	  one	  from	  overcoming	  this	  limited,	  metaphysical	  notion	  of	  language.	  	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  want	  to	   think	   language	   in	   the	   rhetoric-­‐linguistic	   form	   implied	   by	   metaphor	   (X=Y);	   he	  hopes	  to	  think	  language	  as	  the	  calling	  to	  presence	  of	  beings	  that	  opens	  up	  a	  world.	  	   This	  train	  of	  thought	  persists	  throughout	  Heidegger’s	  corpus	  of	  thought,	  from	  
History	  of	  the	  Concept	  of	  Time	  in	  the	  1920’s	  to	  the	  essay	  “Language”	  from	  the	  1950’s;	  it	  is	  a	  theme	  he	  returns	  to	  again	  and	  again.	  Yet	  there	  is	  a	  slight	  change	  of	  focus	  over	  time.	   	   Earlier	   in	   his	   career,	   he	   focuses	   on	   a	   thinking	   of	   language	  prior	   to	   the	   sign	  relation	   model,	   while	   later	   on	   he	   generally	   concentrates	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  language	  marks	  Dasein	  as	  having	  a	  distinctive	  relationship	  to	  being	  and	  to	  beings.	  	  See	  note	  79.	  	  84	  “The	  Origin	  of	  the	  Work	  of	  Art,”	  Poetry,	  Language,	  Thought,	  p.	  71	  	  	  85	  “The	  Nature	  of	  Language,”	  On	  the	  Way	  to	  Language,	  p.	  97	  	  86	  “The	  Nature	  of	  Language,”	  On	  the	  Way	  to	  Language,	  p.	  98	  	  87	  “The	  Way	  to	  Language,”	  On	  the	  Way	  to	  Language,	  p.	  115	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openness	  that	  makes	  language	  possible.88	  	  The	  persistence	  of	  this	  thinking	  attests	  to	  the	  difficulty	  of	  the	  thought:	  how	  is	  one	  to	  express,	  in	  words,	  the	  originary	  openness	  that	  makes	  language	  itself	  possible?	  	  How	  is	  language	  related	  to	  this	  openness?	  	  Can	  this	   openness	   be	   articulated	   through	   words,	   or	   is	   it	   by	   nature	   ineffable?	   	   The	  relationship	  of	   originary	  openness	   and	   language	   as	   a	   discursive	  whole	   is	   complex	  indeed.	  	  	  	  	  	   Early	  on,	  Heidegger’s	  concern	  with	   language	  revolves	  around	  an	  attempt	  to	  think	  a	  notion	  of	  language	  prior	  to	  the	  sign	  relation;	  he	  takes	  language	  to	  be	  much	  broader	  than	  the	  model	  of	  the	  sign	  would	  allow.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  one	  assumes	  the	  basic	  unit	  of	  language	  to	  be	  a	  sign	  that	  corresponds	  to	  a	  signified,	  then	  one	  is	  limited	  to	   a	   very	   narrow	   conception	   of	   language	   that	   does	   not	   account	   for	   the	   range	   of	  phenomena	  associated	  with	   it.	   	  For	  example,	   there	  seem	  to	  be	  several	  phenomena	  associated	   with	   language	   and	   meaning	   that	   are	   not,	   strictly	   speaking,	   verbal:	  consider	  gestures	  and	  vocal	  inflection.	  	  The	  tone	  and	  pitch	  of	  a	  voice	  directly	  affect	  the	  meaning	   of	   the	  word;	   think	   of	   the	  many	  ways	   the	  word	   “no”	   can	   appear	   to	   a	  hearer.	  	  This	  problematizes	  thinking	  of	  the	  word	  “no”	  in	  a	  simple	  sign	  relation,	  as	  its	  meaning	  seems	  to	  be	  attached	  less	  to	  the	  sign,	  and	  more	  to	  vocal	  inflection	  and	  tone.	  	  Can	  one	  understand	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  “no”	  apart	  from	  tone,	  pitch,	  and	  other	  non-­‐	   or	   extra-­‐linguistic	   factors?	   	   But	   even	   this	   way	   of	   construing	   language	   is	   too	  weak	  for	  Heidegger;	  he	  would	  claim	  tone	  and	  pitch	  are	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  meaning	  and	  could	  not	  be	  abstracted	  from	  it	  without	  “a	  very	  artificial	  and	  complicated	  frame	  of	  mind.”89	  	   Heidegger	  illustrates	  this	  claim	  with	  a	  phenomenological	  analysis	  of	  hearing.	  	  Specifically,	   his	   concern	   is	   to	   point	   out	   the	   intrinsic	   belonging	   together	   of	   bodily	  experience	   and	   significance,	   writing,	   “what	   we	   ‘first’	   hear	   is	   never	   noises	   or	  complexes	   of	   sounds,	   but	   the	   creaking	   wagon,	   the	   north	   wind,	   the	   woodpecker	  tapping,	  the	  fire	  crackling.”90	  We	  do	  not,	  in	  other	  words,	  first	  perceive	  raw	  unformed	  sense	   data,	   and	   then	   compare	   it	   with	   other	   sounds	  we	   have	   heard	   in	   the	   past	   in	  order	  to	  determine	  what	  it	  is	  that	  we	  are	  now	  hearing.	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  sound	  and	  meaning	   are	   experienced	   as	   one	   and	   the	   same:	   they	   are	   inseparable	   from	   each	  other.	  What	  we	  hear	  is,	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  meaningful.	  	  According	  to	  Heidegger,	  we	  can	  only	   separate	   sound	   from	   meaning	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   more	   fundamental	  experience.	  	  	   Contained	  within	  this	  phenomenological	  analysis	  is	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  view	  of	  language	   as	   structured	   by	   the	   sign	   relation.	   	   If	   our	   fundamental	   experience	   of	  hearing	  indicates	  a	  unity	  of	  sound	  and	  meaning	  that	  can	  be	  separated	  only	  later	  by	  artificial	   and	   forced	   operations,	   then	   language	   cannot	   be	   founded	   on	   the	   sign	  relation,	  as	   this	  does	  not	  occur	   in	   the	   fundamental	  experience	  of	  hearing.	   	   As	   Smith	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  these	  two	  focuses	  are	  part	  of	  the	  same	  movement	  and	  should	  not	  be	  rigidly	  separated	  from	  each	  other.	  The	  originary	  openness	  to	  beings	  gives	  beings	  of	  which	  we	  can	  then	  speak.	  	  89	  Being	  and	  Time,	  p.	  207	  Heidegger	  uses	  a	  very	  similar	  phrase	  in	  History	  of	  the	  
Concept	  of	  Time	  (p.	  266)	  and	  yet	  again	  in	  What	  is	  Called	  Thinking?	  (p.	  129-­‐130)	  	  90	  Being	  and	  Time,	  p.	  207	  
	   32	  
notes,	   Heidegger’s	   concern	   here	   is	   with	   a	   sort	   of	   meaning	   that	   pervades	   verbal	  language,	  but	  is	  not	  reducible	  to	  it.91	  This	  is	  what	  Heidegger	  refers	  to	  as	  “discourse”	  in	  Being	  and	  Time,	   of	  which	   verbal	   language	   is	   just	   one	   aspect.92	  Discourse,	   at	   its	  base,	  includes	  much	  more	  than	  just	  words.	   	  As	  Heidegger	  notes,	  when	  we	  conceive	  of	  language	  as	  founded	  on	  the	  sign	  relation,	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  view	  sound	  separately	  from	  meaning:	  we	   treat	  meaning	   as	   if	   it	   were	   attacked	   on	   to	   raw,	   abstract	   sense	  data.93	  Language,	   so	   conceived,	   implies	   a	   sensible/intelligible	  opposition	   (between	  sound	   and	   meaning),	   the	   very	   opposition	   that	   is	   put	   into	   question	   by	   his	  phenomenological	  analysis	  of	  hearing.	  	   This	   notion	   of	   non-­‐	   or	   extra-­‐verbal	   language	   is	   illustrated	   by	   Heidegger’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  gesture	  or	  hint.	  	  A	  gesture	  opens	  up	  a	  world:	  through	  it,	  beings	  come	  to	  presence	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  This	  illustrates	  the	  co-­‐belonging	  of	  bodily	  and	  linguistic	  openness	  to	  beings.	  For	  example,	  when	  a	  fellow	  motorist	  gives	  you	  “the	  finger,”	  your	  surroundings	  tend	  to	  appear	  in	  a	  different	  light	  than	  they	  had	  just	  before.	  	  Perhaps,	  upon	  seeing	  it,	  you	  realize	  you	  had	  just	  cut	  someone	  off;	  or	  you	  might	  wonder	  what	  you	   did	   to	   deserve	   such	   an	   act.	   In	   any	   case,	   this	   gesture	   problematizes	   the	  sensible/intelligible	   separation	   posited	   at	   it	   basis,	   straddling	   both	   body	   and	  language	   in	   a	   way	   that	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   either.	   While	   “the	   finger”	   has	   a	  meaning,	   its	   meaning	   cannot	   be	   thought	   apart	   from	   bodily	   phenomenon	   (unlike	  speech,	  which	   tends	   to	  be	   abstracted	   away	   from	   the	  body).	   In	   this	  way,	   a	   gesture	  reveals	  the	  necessary	  co-­‐belonging	  of	  body	  and	  language.	  A	  gesture	  does	  not	   reveal	   anything	   “unknown.”	  Rather,	  with	   a	   gesture,	   one	  indicates	   one’s	   engagement	   with	   beings	   that	   is	   implicitly	   guided	   by	   an	   originary	  understanding	  of	  beings.	  Only	  because	  we	  are	  ahead	  of	  ourselves	   in	   the	  world,	   i.e.	  have	  a	  pre-­‐conscious	  awareness	  of	  what	  we	  are	  up	  to	  in	  our	  surroundings,	  can	  we	  understand	   the	   meaning	   of	   a	   gesture.	   With	   a	   gesture	   (a	   bodily	   movement),	   one	  opens	   up	   a	   world.	   This	   aspect	   of	   gesture	   (inseparability	   of	   body	   and	   meaning)	  indicates	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  it	  and	  the	  originary	  openness	  that	  makes	  language	  possible.	  A	  gesture	  calls	  beings	  to	  presence	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  lets	  them	  be.	   That	   is,	   a	   gesture	   reveals	   something	   that	   has	   already	   been	   disclosed	  within	   a	  particular	   open	   and	   understood	   at	   a	   pre-­‐cognitive	   level;	   in	   disclosing	   what	   has	  already	  been	  understood,	  it	  calls	  beings	  to	  presence,	  letting	  them	  be.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  gesture,	  then,	  instantiates	  two	  qualities	  that	  cannot	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  an	  account	  of	   language	  structured	  by	   the	  sign	  relation.	   In	   the	   first	  place,	   it	   is	  non-­‐verbal;	   a	   gesture	   does	   not	   employ	   or	   rely	   upon	  words.	   It	   is	   intrinsically	   a	   bodily	  phenomenon.	   This	   points	   to	   a	   discursive	   milieu	   that	   is	   broader	   than	   can	   be	  accounted	  for	  in	  a	  signifier/signified	  model	  of	  language.	  In	  the	  second	  place,	  it	  calls	  beings	   into	   presence,	   taking	   what	   was	   only	   tacitly	   understood	   and	   bringing	   it	  explicitly	  to	  presence.	  	  	  A	   gesture	   calls	   into	   question	   the	   sensible/intelligible	   opposition	   as	  well	   as	  the	  linguistic	  model	  of	  language	  as	  sign	  relation,	  since	  it	  is	  a	  non-­‐verbal,	  physical	  act	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Sounding/Silence,	  p.	  68	  	  92	  Being	  and	  Time,	  p.	  204	  	  93	  What	  is	  Called	  Thinking?,	  p.	  129-­‐130	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of	  meaning.	   	   In	   a	   gesture,	  meaning	   is	   inseparable	   from	   its	   bodily	   articulation	   –	   it	  defies	   the	   framework	   that	   would	   be	   imposed	   on	   it	   by	   the	   sign	   relation.	   	   For	  Heidegger,	  this	  constitutes	  a	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  a	  rethinking	  of	  bodily	  experience	  and	  meaning.	   	   In	   a	   gesture,	  meaning	   and	   language	   cannot	   be	   thought	   apart	   from	  bodily	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	   as	   in	   it	   the	   body	   alone	   calls	   beings	   into	   presence:	   no	  verbal	   language	   is	   employed.	   A	   gesture	   is	   not	   a	   sign	   that	   expresses	   an	   internal,	  purely	   intelligible	   state	   of	   affairs;	   unmediated	   by	   the	   sign	   relation,	   a	   gesture	   calls	  beings	   to	   presence.	   This	   indicates	   the	   implication	   of	   body	   in	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world;	  Heidegger	   calls	   this	   “bodying	   forth.”94 	  But	   while	   the	   meaning	   of	   a	   gesture	   is	  inseparable	  from	  the	  body	  and	  its	  movement,	  Heidegger	  warns	  against	  reducing	  the	  essence	  of	  a	  gesture	  to	  these,	  maintaining	  that	  its	  essence	  is	  “hard	  to	  say.”95	  	  In	  any	  case,	  a	  gesture	  indicates	  the	  co-­‐belonging	  of	  meaning	  and	  body	  in	  a	  way	  that	  cannot	  be	  appropriated	  by	  the	  sign	  relation	  model	  of	  language.	  But	  such	  a	  model	  of	  language	  is	  insufficient,	  in	  Heidegger’s	  mind,	  in	  another	  way	   as	   well;	   it	   is	   unable	   to	   account	   for	   language’s	   relationship	   to	   the	   originary	  openness	  to	  beings.	  	  For	  Heidegger,	  language	  calls	  beings	  into	  presence	  from	  out	  of	  an	   originary	   openness	   to	   beings;	   language	   depends	   on	   this	   openness,	   which	   is	  characterized	   as	   the	   surpassing	   of	   beings.	   	   One	   can	   speak	   of	   beings	   only	   if	   those	  beings	  have	  already,	  in	  a	  certain	  sense,	  revealed	  themselves.	  	  As	  such,	  language	  is	  a	  “showing”	   inasmuch	   as	   it	   shows	   beings.96	  	   This	   showing	   depends	   upon	   a	   prior	  understanding	   of	   beings	   that	   is	   not	   explicitly	   thematized,	   but	   underlies	   and	  structures	  Dasein’s	  being	  in	  the	  world.97	  	  In	  other	  words,	  language	  always	  and	  only	  shows	   beings	   that	   have	   come	   to	   presence	   in	   some	   way,	   possibly	   in	   a	   disclosure	  anterior	  to	  explicit	  awareness.	  	  It	  does	  this	  by	  distinguishing	  beings,	  and	  separating	  them	   from	   each	   other,	   and	   in	   doing	   so	   articulating	   and	   opening	   a	   space	   in	  which	  beings	  are	  set	  into	  relation.	  	  	   Heidegger	  captures	  this	  joining-­‐separating	  nature	  of	  language	  with	  the	  word	  
Riss.	  In	  The	  Origin	  of	  the	  Work	  of	  Art	  he	  characterizes	  Riss	  as	  “the	  intimacy	  with	  	  which	  opponents	  belong	  to	  each	  other.”98	  In	  other	  words,	  Riss	  is	  the	  difference	  that	  joins	  two	  distinct	  but	  essentially	   implicated	  realms.99	  	  As	  this	  difference,	   it	  gathers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Heidegger,	  Zollikon	  Seminars,	  p.	  91	  	  95	  “A	  Dialogue	  on	  Language,”	  On	  the	  Way	  to	  Language,	  p.18.	  This	  characterization	  of	  a	  gesture	  is	  given	  by	  the	  “Japanese”	  (Tomio	  Tezuka)	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  “Inquirer”	  (Heidegger),	  but	  Heidegger’s	  approval	  of	  it	  is	  apparent	  in	  the	  text.	  	  96	  “The	  Way	  to	  Language,”	  On	  the	  Way	  to	  Language,	  p.	  123	  “The	  essential	  being	  of	  language	  is	  Saying	  as	  Showing.”	  	  97	  “On	  the	  Essence	  of	  Ground,”	  Pathmarks,	  p.	  104.	  	  “The	  understanding	  of	  being	  that	  guides	  and	  illuminates	  all	  comportment	  toward	  beings	  in	  neither	  a	  grasping	  of	  beings	  as	  such,	  nor	  is	  it	  a	  conceptual	  comprehending	  of	  what	  is	  thus	  grasped.”	  (emphasis	  added)	  	  98	  “The	  Origin	  of	  the	  Work	  of	  Art,”	  Poetry,	  Language,	  Thought,	  p.	  61	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disparate	   elements	   around	   itself,	   joining	   them	   together	   yet	   maintaining	   their	  irresolvable	   difference.	   	   The	  work	   of	   art	   embodies	   this	   tension	   of	   the	  Riss,	   and	   it	  establishes	   the	  truth	  of	   the	  work,	  bringing	  beings	   to	  presence	   in	  a	  particular	   light.	  	  As	  Heidegger	  writes	   “the	  rift-­‐design	   (Riss)	  is	   the	  drawing	   together,	   into	  a	  unity,	  of	  sketch	   and	   basic	   design,	   breach	   and	   outline.”100	  Riss	  brings	   distinct	   and	   different	  elements	  together,	  joining	  them	  by	  virtue	  of	  this	  difference.	  	  	  In	  What	  is	  Called	  Thinking?	  Heidegger	  characterizes	  this	  joining-­‐separating	  of	  language	  as	  “calling	  into	  name.”	  	  In	  naming,	  “we	  call	  on	  what	  is	  present	  to	  arrive.”101	  	  That	  is,	  the	  use	  of	  language	  depends	  upon	  a	  prior	  disclosure	  of	  beings;	  it	  “calls”	  them	  to	  presence	  out	  of	  the	  open	  that	  frames	  them.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  be	  understood	  either	  as	  merely	  a	  reference	  to	  beings	  that	  are	  already	  present,	  or	  as	  a	  purely	  creative	  act	  that	  makes	  beings	  appear	  out	  of	  thin	  air.	   	  Rather,	   language	  is	  a	  way	  of	  attending	  to	  the	  disclosure	  of	  beings	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  gives	  them	  to	  be	  thought.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  as	  an	  “anticipatory	  reaching	  out”	  that	  shapes	  the	  open	  in	  which	  beings	  appear	  and	  can	  be	  encountered.102	  	  Thus,	   in	  revealing	  beings,	   language	  also	  affects	  the	  open	  in	  which	   beings	   appear;	   the	   two	   are	   intertwined	   in	   a	   dynamic	   and	   reciprocal	  relationship,	   shaping	   each	   other.	   	   Beings	   come	   to	   presence	   in	   the	   originary	   open:	  thus	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  language	  to	  show	  them.	  	  In	  showing	  them,	  language	  affects	  and	  engenders	  the	  originary	  open	  in	  which	  beings	  are	  disclosed.	  	  The	  sign	  relation,	  since	  it	   is	   limited	   to	   designating	   beings	   with	   labels,	   cannot	   account	   for	   this	   dynamic	  relation	  between	  originary	  openness	  to	  beings	  and	  language.	  	  	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Heidegger’s	  concerns	  with	  language	  diverge	  from	  those	   held	   by	   most	   rhetorical,	   semantic,	   and	   hermeneutic	   theoreticians.	   	   He	   is	  interested	  in	  two	  things	  as	  far	  as	  language	  is	  concerned:	  a	  thinking	  of	  it	  prior	  to	  the	  sign	  relation,	  and	  a	  thinking	  of	  the	  originary	  openness	  that	  makes	  language	  possible.	  	  An	   analysis	   of	   the	   intrinsic	   meaningfulness	   of	   bodily	   experience	   leads	   him	   to	  question	   and	   rethink	   the	   sensible/intelligible	   divide	   implied	   by	   the	   sign	   relation	  model	  of	  language.	  	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  he	  characterizes	  language	  as	  a	  naming	  power,	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  open	  up	  a	  world	  within	  which	  beings	  appear	  and	  are	  set	  into	   relation.	   	  This	  naming	  power	   calls	  beings	   to	  presence	   from	   the	  pre-­‐cognitive,	  pre-­‐linguistic	  understanding	  where	  they	  had	  lain	  unnoticed.	  This	  notion	  of	  language	  cannot	   be	   appropriated	   into	   a	   model	   of	   language	   structured	   by	   the	   sign	   relation	  without	  undermining	   the	  very	  concerns	   that	  guided	   the	  project	   from	  the	  start.	   	  Of	  course,	   Heidegger	   would	   not	   deny	   the	   correctness	   of	   these	   interpretations	   of	  language	  from	  a	  certain	  point	  of	  view,	  as	  long	  as	  one	  kept	  in	  mind	  the	  limits	  of	  such	  an	  endeavor,	  and	  their	  basic	  unsuitability	  and	  inability	  to	  disclose	  the	  happening	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Riss	  is	  used	  to	  characterize	  the	  co-­‐belonging	  of	  world	  and	  earth	  in	  “The	  Origin	  of	  the	  Work	  of	  Art”	  and	  poetry	  and	  thinking	  in	  “The	  Nature	  of	  Language.”	  	  100	  “The	  Origin	  of	  the	  Work	  of	  Art,”	  Poetry,	  Language,	  Thought,	  p.	  61	  	  101	  What	  is	  Called	  Thinking?,	  p.	  120	  	  102	  What	  is	  Called	  Thinking?,	  p.	  117	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truth.103	  He	  would,	  however,	  deny	  their	  capacity	  to	  disclose	  the	  essence	  of	  language	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  originary	  openness,	  which	  occurs	  prior	  to	  the	  sensible/intelligible	  opposition	  and	  the	  sign	  relation	  model	  of	  language.	  	  	  4.2	  Heidegger	  and	  Metaphor	  	   As	   far	   as	   the	   commentary	   on	   Heidegger	   and	   metaphor	   is	   concerned,	  Heidegger	  explicitly	  mentions	  metaphor	  only	  four	  times	  throughout	  the	  entirety	  of	  his	   prolific	   career,	   but	   the	   placement	   of	   each	   succinct	   statement	   occurs	   within	   a	  common	  line	  of	  thought,	  that	  of	  undergoing	  an	  “experience	  with	  language.”104	  	  Each	  time,	   metaphor	   is	   claimed	   to	   interfere	   with	   the	   possibility	   of	   undergoing	   this	  experience.	  	  In	  a	  lecture	  on	  Hölderlin’s	  hymn	  “Andenken,”	  he	  writes,	  “the	  key	  to	  all	  ‘poetics,’	   the	   doctrine	   of	   ‘images’	   in	   poetry,	   of	   ‘metaphor,’	   cannot	   open	   any	   single	  door	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   Hölderlynian	   hymnal	   poetry.”105	  In	   a	   lecture	   on	   Hölderlin’s	  poem	   “Der	   Ister,”	   he	   writes	   “symbolic	   images…	   allegory,	   simile,	   and	   metaphor,	  example	   and	   insignia”	   are	   all	   metaphysical	   notions	   that	   are	   closed	   off	   to	   the	  happening	   of	   language	   disclosed	   in	  Hölderlin’s	   poetry.106	  The	   two	  more	   extensive	  references,	  which	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  much	  the	  commentary,	  are	  found	  in	  “The	  Nature	  of	  Language”	  and	  The	  Principle	  of	  Reason	  and	  run	  along	  similar	  lines.	  	   One	   might	   take	   this	   to	   imply	   Heidegger’s	   lack	   of	   interest	   in	   questions	   of	  metaphor;	   but,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   metaphor	   lies	   at	   the	   center	   of	   his	   attempt	   to	  undergo	   an	   experience	   with	   language,	   albeit	   in	   a	   negative	   way.	   In	   other	   words,	  metaphor	   embodies	   a	   view	   of	   language	   that	   prevents	   us	   from	   	   “undergoing	   an	  experience	  with	  language.”	  All	  four	  references	  posit	  metaphor	  and	  symbolic	  images	  as	  belonging	  inherently	  to	  metaphysics.	  	  It	  is	  this	  aspect	  that	  most	  commentators	  on	  Heidegger	   and	   metaphor	   have	   focused	   on.	   But,	   as	   Smith	   points	   out,	   Heidegger’s	  
denunciations	  of	  metaphor	  take	  place	  within	  an	  attempt	  to	  think	  language’s	  capacity	  
to	   name	  without	   relying	   on	   the	   sensible/intelligible	   opposition.107	  In	   this	   sense,	   his	  criticism	  of	  metaphor	  develops	  his	   critique	  of	   the	   sign	   relation	  model	  of	   language	  and	  his	  re-­‐thinking	  of	  bodily	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	   	  While	  Heidegger	  does	  assert	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  In	  “The	  Origin	  of	  the	  Work	  of	  Art,”	  Heidegger	  writes,	  regarding	  the	  grounding	  of	  truth,	  “By	  contrast,	  science	  is	  not	  an	  original	  happening	  of	  truth,	  but	  always	  the	  cultivation	  of	  a	  domain	  of	  truth	  already	  opened,	  specifically	  by	  apprehending	  and	  confirming	  that	  which	  shows	  itself	  to	  be	  possibly	  and	  necessarily	  correct	  within	  that	  field.”	  (“The	  Origin	  of	  the	  Work	  of	  Art,”	  Poetry,	  Language,	  Thought,	  p.	  60)	  Likewise,	  a	  sign	  relation	  model	  of	  language	  is	  well	  suited	  to	  analyze	  sign-­‐referent	  relationships	  within	  language	  but	  unsuited	  to	  disclose	  the	  essence	  of	  language	  or	  the	  happening	  of	  truth.	  	  	  	  	  104	  Of	  course	  with	  Heidegger’s	  Gesamstausgabe	  now	  reaching	  102	  volumes,	  it	  is	  possible	  there	  are	  other	  references	  to	  metaphor	  waiting	  to	  be	  discovered.	  	  105	  Elucidations	  of	  Hölderlin's	  Poetry,	  p.40	  	  106	  Hölderlin’s	  Hymn	  “The	  Ister,”	  p.	  16-­‐17	  	  107	  Sound/Silence,	  p.	  102	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the	   metaphorical	   exists	   only	   within	   metaphysics,	   this	   is	   merely	   his	   point	   of	  departure	   from	  which	  he	  hopes	   to	   rethink	   the	   relationship	  of	  bodily	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	   language,	   and	  meaning.	   	   It	   is	   important	   for	   Heidegger	   to	   reject	  metaphor,	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  is	  intrinsically	  structured	  by	  the	  view	  of	  language	  he	  is	  trying	  to	  think	  beyond.	  	  	  	   Let’s	  explore	  the	  previous	  claim.	  	  	  	   In	   both	  The	  Principle	  of	  Reason	   and	   “The	  Nature	   of	   Language,”	   Heidegger’s	  references	  to	  metaphor	  occur	  within	  analyses	  of	  hearing	  similar	  to	  those	  discussed	  above	   from	  Being	  and	  Time.	   Heidegger	   once	   again	   emphasizes	   the	   unity	   of	   sound	  and	   meaning,	   but	   this	   time	   he	   underscores	   just	   how	   this	   undermines	   the	  physiological	  explanations	  of	  hearing	  and	  the	  sign	  relation	  model.	  This	  leads	  him	  to	  wonder	  about	  the	  “real	  nature	  of	  language,”	  writing,	  “It	  is	  much	  more	  important	  to	  consider	   whether…	   the	   physical	   element	   of	   language,	   its	   vocal	   and	   written	  character,	  is	  being	  adequately	  experienced.”108	  	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  deny	  the	  efficacy	  of	   what	   he	   calls	   the	   “phonetic-­‐acoustic-­‐physiological	   explanation,”	   but	   he	   claims	  these	  explanations	  do	  not	  disclose	   the	  essence	  of	   language	  or	  our	   relationship	   (as	  ones	  who	  speak)	  to	  language.109	  	  	  This	   point	   of	   view	   is	   illustrated	   through	   Heidegger’s	   phenomenological	  analysis	   of	   hearing.	   	   Merely	   physiological	   explanations	   of	   hearing,	   according	   to	  Heidegger,	   view	   the	   ear	   simply	   as	   an	  organ	   for	   receiving	   sonic	   sense	  data.	   In	   this	  schema,	  the	  ear	  funnels	  sense	  data	  into	  the	  brain,	  which	  then	  interprets	  it,	  attaching	  a	   meaning	   to	   the	   sound.	   Meaning	   is	   abstracted	   out	   of	   sound,	   implying	   a	  sensible/intelligible	  model	  of	  phenomenal	  experience	  and	  language.	  If,	  as	  Heidegger	  claims,	  sound	  and	  meaning	  cannot	  be	  thought	  apart	  from	  each	  other,	  then	  models	  of	  language	  that	  rely	  on	  either	  sensible/intelligible	  opposition	  or	  the	  sign	  relation	  are	  inappropriate	  for	  disclosing	  the	  essence	  of	  language.	  With	  these	  analyses,	  Heidegger	  gestures	  towards	  a	  rethinking	  of	  the	  phenomenality	  of	  body	  and	  meaning	  and	  their	  co-­‐belonging.	  Our	  experience	  of	  language	  is	  broader	  and	  richer	  than	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  the	  sensible/intelligible	  or	  sign	  relation	  models;	  Heidegger	  writes,	  “Whatever	  is	  heard	  by	  us	  never	  exhausts	  itself	  in	  what	  our	  ears…	  can	  pick	  up,”	  and,	  “We	  hear,	  not	  the	  ear.”110	  In	  other	  words,	  hearing	  is	  a	  much	  more	  complicated	  phenomenon	  than	  the	   sensible/intelligible	   model	   would	   allow.	   Thinking	   of	   the	   ear	   as	   an	   organ	  designed	  merely	   to	   register	   abstract	   sense	   data	   is	   insufficient	   for	   describing	   and	  understanding	   the	  experience	  of	  hearing	   that	  we	  actually	  have.	   	  Heidegger	  asserts	  that	   we	   have	   ears	   because	   we	   can	   hear,	   rather	   than	   the	   opposite.111	  Hearing,	   as	  Dasein	   hears,	   implies	   an	   intimate	   being-­‐with	   beings,	   i.e.	   a	   manner	   of	   relating	   to	  beings	   that	   cannot	   be	   accounted	   for	   by	   a	   view	   of	   language	   implied	   by	  metaphor.	  	  What	  and	  how	  the	  ear	  perceives	  is	  determined	  by	  our	  pre-­‐reflective	  understanding	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  “The	  Nature	  of	  Language,”	  On	  the	  Way	  to	  Language,	  p.	  96	  	  109	  “The	  Way	  to	  Language,”	  On	  the	  Way	  to	  Language,	  p.	  121-­‐122	  	  110	  The	  Principle	  of	  Reason,	  p.	  47	  (italics	  in	  the	  original)	  	  111	  Smith	  makes	  this	  observation	  in	  Sounding/Silence,	  p.	  115.	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of	  our	  being	   in	  a	  world,	   indicating	   that	   the	  phenomenon	  of	  hearing	   should	  not	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  sense	  data	  the	  ear	  receives.	  	  	  The	  ear	  cannot	  be	  separated	   from	  the	  body,	  nor	  can	  the	  body	  be	  separated	  from	  its	  embeddedness	  in	  the	  world	  (among	  beings).	  	  As	  such,	  what	  it	  means	  to	  hear	  must	  be	  thought	  apart	   from	  this	  separation.	   	  With	  this,	  he	  hopes	  to	  begin	  thinking	  the	   richness	   of	  meaningful	   bodily	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	   a	   thinking	   that	   exceeds	   the	  sensible/intelligible	  opposition	  and	  the	  sign	  relation	  model	  of	  language.	  	  	  What	  we	  hear,	  we	  hear	  because	  we	  are	  already	  attuned	  to	  our	  environment	  and	  surroundings	  as	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world;	  it	  is	  because	  we	  are	  always	  already	  thrown	  into	  a	  world	  that	  we	  experience	  phenomena	  as	  meaningful	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  There	  is	   no	   separation	   of	   sense	   and	   intelligibility	   in	   Dasein’s	   primordial	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	   	   Intelligibility	   is	  not	  added	  onto	  to	  bare	  sense	  data;	  we	  hear	  the	   jet	  passing	  overhead,	   or	   hear	   the	   siren	   of	   the	   ambulance	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   not	   after	   abstract	  calculations.	   	  This	  analysis	  of	  hearing	  implies	  dasein’s	  always	  already	  being	  among	  beings	  as	  well	  as	  its	  always	  being	  ahead	  of	  itself	  in	  its	  world.	  	  Only	  because	  Dasein	  is	  already	   in	   a	  world	   and	   ahead	  of	   itself	   can	   it	   hear	   as	   it	   does;	   this	   accounts	   for	   the	  unity	  of	  sound	  and	  meaning.	  	  When	  Dasein	  hears	  and	  understands	  poetic	  language,	  it	  is	  because	  the	  word	  “sounds	  out”	  and	  calls	  beings	  to	  presence	  from	  the	  originary	  openness	  in	  which	  Dasein	  dwells,	  opening	  up	  a	  world.112	  	  	  	  Interestingly,	  Heidegger	  extends	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  from	  hearing	  to	  seeing,	  writing	   “If	   human	   vision	   remained	   confined	   to	   what	   is	   piped	   in	   as	   sensations	  through	  the	  eye	  to	  the	  retina,	  then,	  for	  instance,	  the	  Greeks	  would	  never	  have	  been	  able	  to	  see	  Apollo	  in	  a	  statue	  of	  a	  young	  man…”113	  In	  other	  words,	  when	  we	  see,	  we	  do	   more	   than	   utilize	   organs	   for	   the	   reception	   of	   sense	   data.	   	   We	   see	   with	   and	  through	   our	   originary	   understanding,	   which	   includes	   and	   extends	   to	   much	   more	  than	   our	   conscious	   perceptions.	   	   When	   we	   see,	   how	   beings	   come	   to	   presence	   is	  drawn	   from	   our	   thrownness,	   our	   historical	   epoch,	   what	   we	   are	   “up	   to,”	   our	  attunement	   to	   our	   environment,	   etc.;	   it	   is	   never	   the	   mere	   registering	   of	   abstract	  sense	  data,	  distilled	  from	  any	  world	  in	  which	  it	  would	  come	  to	  presence.	  	  With	  this	  line	  of	  thinking,	  Heidegger	  gestures	  to	  more	  fundamental	  way	  of	  conceiving	  of	  our	  embodied	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	   to	  what	  he	  calls	  “a	  more	  profoundly	  thought	  human	  being.”114	  	   Presumably,	   the	   analysis	   of	   hearing	   and	   seeing	   can	   be	   extrapolated	   to	  include	  all	  modes	  of	  sense	  perception	  as	  well.	  	   But	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  pursue	  this	  line	  of	  thought,	  claiming	  that	  it	  is	  “off	  the	  mark	  to	  insist	  that	  thinking	  and	  listening	  as	  bringing	  into	  view	  are	  only	  meant	  as	  a	  transposition	  of	  meaning…	  from	  the	  supposedly	  sensible	   into	   the	  non-­‐sensible.”115	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  “The	  sound	  rings	  out	  in	  the	  resounding	  assembly	  call	  which,	  open	  to	  the	  Open,	  makes	  World	  appear	  in	  all	  things.	  	  The	  sounding	  of	  the	  voice	  is	  no	  longer	  of	  the	  order	  of	  the	  physical	  organs.”	  “The	  Nature	  of	  Language,”	  On	  the	  Way	  to	  Language,	  p.	  101	  	  113	  The	  Principle	  of	  Reason,	  p.	  47-­‐48	  	  114	  The	  Principle	  of	  Reason,	  p.	  48	  	  115	  The	  Principle	  of	  Reason,	  p.	  48	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Shortly	  thereafter,	  he	  notes,	  “The	  idea	  of	  transposing	  and	  of	  metaphor	  is	  based	  upon	  the	  distinguishing,	  if	  not	  the	  complete	  separation,	  of	  the	  sensible	  and	  nonsensible	  as	  two	   realms	   that	   subsist	   on	   their	   own.”	   116 	  Using	   the	   notion	   of	   metaphor	   to	  understand	   language	   and	   our	   relationship	   to	   it	   necessarily	   imports	   a	  sensible/intelligible	   opposition	   into	   our	   thinking,	   and	   this	   prevents	   us	   from	  adequately	  thinking	  the	  phenomena	  of	  seeing	  and	  hearing,	  and	  bodily	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  in	  general.	  	  Although	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  pursue	  this	  question	  at	  length,	  it	  is	  a	  fairly	   radical	   line	   of	   thought,	   a	   re-­‐thinking	   of	   our	   basic	   experience	   of	   meaningful	  
bodily	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	   which	   seems	   to	   suggest	   interesting	   and	   perhaps	  compelling	  possibilities.	  	  	  While	   his	   rejection	   of	   metaphor	   might	   also	   legitimately	   relate	   to	   other	  aspects	   of	   his	   thought,	   it	   seems	   primarily	   embedded	   within	   his	   thinking	   of	   the	  essence	  of	  language	  and	  Dasein’s	  distinctive	  relationship	  to	  the	  originary	  openness	  as	  it	  impacts	  the	  way	  we	  think	  of	  our	  basic	  experience	  in	  the	  world.	  	  In	  this	  light,	  it	  seems	  a	  shame	  that	  so	  much	  of	  the	  debate	  regarding	  Heidegger’s	  peculiar	  language	  has	   been	   done	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   metaphor	   and	   the	   sign	   relation,	   as	   this	  inevitably	  pulls	  the	  analysis	  in	  the	  very	  direction	  he	  is	  hoping	  to	  avoid.	  	  Metaphor	  is	  intrinsically	   intertwined	   with	   notions	   of	   the	   sign	   relation	   and	   the	  sensible/intelligible	  opposition.	   	  Neither	  of	   these	  concepts	   is	  suited	  to	  address	   the	  rich	  and	  complex	  relationship	  Heidegger	  claims	  we	  have	  with	  language.	  	  Of	  course,	  readers	   may	   read	   Heidegger’s	   text	   as	   they	   wish;	   but	   reading	   it	   as	   metaphorical	  precludes	  one	  from	  even	  considering	  the	  possibilities	  of	  the	  question	  he	  poses,	  that	  of	  a	  radical	  re-­‐thinking	  of	  the	  relationship	  of	  physical	  phenomenality,	  meaning,	  and	  language.	   	  It	  is	  in	  order	  to	  open	  up	  this	  avenue	  of	  thought	  that	  Heidegger	  instructs	  his	  reader	  not	  to	  understand	  his	  peculiar	  language	  as	  metaphorical.	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CHAPTER	  5:	  CONCLUSION	  
	  We	  have	  seen,	  then,	  that	  Heidegger’s	  interest	  in	  language,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  way	  he	  thinks	  of	  language,	  diverges	  sharply	  from	  traditional	  models	  of	  language.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  his	  hope	  to	  be	  able	  to	  think	  language	  apart	  from	  these	  models.	  	  Heidegger	  is	  less	  interested	   in	  words	   and	   conventional	   sign	   theories	   then	  he	   is	   in	   investigating	   the	  human	  being’s	  distinctive	  relationship	  to	  language.	  	  In	  his	  mind,	  this	  relationship	  is	  not	  founded	  on	  either	  the	  sensible/intelligible	  opposition	  or	  the	  sign	  relation;	  these	  are	  not	  broad	  enough	  to	  account	  for	  our	  relationship	  to	  language,	  nor	  do	  they	  occur	  in	  our	  basic	  experiences.	  	  This	  is	  illustrated	  through	  his	  phenomenological	  analysis	  of	   hearing:	  Heidegger	   takes	   this	   to	   show	   the	  unity	   of	   sound	   and	  meaning,	   a	   unity	  that	   cannot	   be	   accounted	   for	   by	   the	   sensible/intelligible	   opposition	   or	   the	   sign	  relation.	   	   Meaning	   cannot	   be	   extracted	   from	   sound	   without	   engaging	   in	   abstract	  thought	   experiments.	   	   This	   unity	   indicates	   the	   beginnings	   of	   a	   rethinking	   of	   the	  relationship	   of	   bodily	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	   originary	   openness	   to	   beings,	   and	  meaning.	  	   For	  Heidegger,	  metaphor	  disrupts	  this	  unity,	  as	  it	  involves	  the	  transfer	  of	  an	  image	   and	   therefore	   a	   division.	   	  When	   one	   says,	   “love	   is	  war,”	   the	   idea	   of	  war	   is	  transferred	  onto	  that	  of	  love.	  	  This	  semantic	  transfer	  implied	  by	  metaphor	  makes	  it	  inappropriate	  for	  thinking	  the	  fundamental	  mode	  of	  our	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  	  	   When	  Ricoeur	  addresses	  Heidegger’s	  rejection	  of	  metaphor,	  he	  does	  so	  from	  the	   perspective	   of	   the	   emergence	   of	   meaning	   within	   language.	   	   For	   Ricoeur,	  metaphor	   “translates”	   an	   unexplained	   phenomenon	   into	   something	   known.	   	   This	  makes	   it	   well	   suited	   to	   facilitate	   the	   emergence	   of	   meaning	   and	   the	   creation	   of	  concepts.	  	  In	  a	  sense,	  this	  is	  a	  legitimate	  way	  to	  think	  of	  metaphor’s	  functioning,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  speak	  to	  the	  substance	  of	  Heidegger’s	  concern	  with	  language.	  	  When	  one	  tries	   to	   think	   the	   fundamental	  nature	  of	  bodily	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  metaphor	  only	  interferes,	  since	  it	  entails	  an	  opposition	  that	  does	  not	  occur	  at	  this	  basic	  level.	  	  It	  is	  possible,	   and	   perhaps	   even	   likely,	   that	   Heidegger	  would	   concede	   to	  metaphor	   its	  role	  in	  developing	  concepts.	  	  But	  he	  would	  stringently	  deny	  its	  ability	  to	  disclose	  the	  nature	   of	   our	   fundamental	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	   	   As	   such,	   Ricoeur’s	   interpretation	  fails	  to	  confront	  the	  gist	  of	  Heidegger’s	  rejection	  of	  metaphor.	  	   Derrida	  approaches	  Heidegger’s	  rejection	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  metaphor’s	  implication	   in	   philosophy.	   Like	   Ricoeur,	   Derrida	   characterizes	   metaphor	   as	   a	  necessary	  aspect	  of	   language;	  unlike	  Ricoeur,	  Derrida	  doubts	   the	  metaphoricity	  of	  language	  can	  ever	  be	  fully	  determined	  or	  controlled.	  	  In	  any	  case,	  this	  also	  prevents	  him	  from	  addressing	  the	  substance	  of	  Heidegger’s	  rejection	  of	  metaphor:	  instead	  of	  linking	   it	   to	   bodily	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	   he	   connects	   it	   to	   the	   metaphorico-­‐metonymical	   deferral	   of	   being,	   i.e.	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   being	   and	   the	   refolding	  structure	  of	  metaphysics.	  	  	   When	  Derrida	  determines	  Heidegger’s	   language	  as	  “quasi-­‐metaphorical,”	  he	  places	  Heidegger’s	  rejection	  of	  metaphor	  within	  a	  framework	  structured	  by	  the	  sign	  relation.	   	   Of	   course,	   Derrida’s	   analysis	   focuses	   on	   how	   this	   structures	   folds	   in	   on	  itself	  when	  it	  tries	  to	  name	  being,	  but	  this	  reading	  also	  fails	  to	  address	  the	  substance	  of	  Heidegger’s	  rejection	  of	  metaphor.	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   Both	   Derrida	   and	   Ricoeur	   have	   interesting,	   and	   compelling,	   analyses	   of	  metaphor;	  but	  they	  are	  still	  inappropriate	  for	  thinking	  the	  relation	  of	  bodily	  being-­‐in-­‐
the-­‐world,	  originary	  openness	   to	  beings,	  and	  meaning.	   And	   it	   this	   in	   the	   attempt	   to	  think	   this	   relation	   that	   Heidegger	   rejects	   metaphor.	   If	   one	   finds	   Heidegger’s	  phenomenological	  analysis	  of	  hearing	  compelling,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  how	  metaphor	  is	  unsuited	   to	   describe	   this	   phenomenon.	   	   While	   neither	   Derrida	   nor	   Ricoeur	   are	  necessarily	   “wrong”	   about	   metaphor,	   they	   simply	   fail	   to	   address	   the	   reason	  Heidegger	  rejects	  it	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	   Consider	   once	   more	   the	   phrase,	   “I	   love	   you.”	   Potentially,	   this	   phrase	   can	  transform	   the	  body:	   the	  heart	  beats	   faster	   and	  palms	   sweat.	   It	   calls	   to	  presence	  a	  world	   in	   a	   way	   that	   indicates	   the	   inseparable	   connection	   of	   body	   and	   language.	  Upon	   hearing	   these	  words,	   one	  might	   blush:	   is	   blushing	   a	   bodily	   phenomenon	   or	  mental	   phenomenon?	   	   Heidegger	   contends	   it	   is	   neither:	   “blushing”	   defies	   both	   of	  these	  characterizations	  and	  challenges	  us	  to	  transform	  how	  we	  think	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  human	  existence.	  Language,	  then,	  appears	  to	  have	  an	  intrinsic	  connection	  to	  the	  body,	  so	  close	  that	  even	  to	  distinguish	  between	  them	  in	  this	  way	  serves	  to	  conceal	  the	  manner	  of	  their	  intimate	  co-­‐belonging.	  It	   is	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  that	  the	  sign	  relation	  model	  of	   language	  can	  account	  for	  language’s	   relationship	   to	   body.	   We	   hear	   words	   that	   are	   meaningful	   in	   the	   first	  place,	  not	  meaningless	  sound;	  but	  the	  sign	  relation	  presupposes	  this	  divide	  between	  sensibility	   and	   intelligibility.117	  Metaphor	   has	   often	   been	   used	   to	   explain	   sense	  perception	  or	   the	  emergence	  of	  meaning;	  but	   since	   it	  presupposes	  a	   sign	   relation,	  and	  therefore	  a	  sensible/intelligible	  opposition,	  it	  is	  unfit	  for	  this	  purpose.118	  Heidegger’s	  language	  takes	  such	  a	  peculiar	  form	  because	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  his	  project.	  	  He	  claims	  both	  “the	  being	  of	  language	  nowhere	  brings	  itself	  to	  words	  as	  the	  language	  of	  being”	  and	  “the	  being	  of	   language	  puts	  itself	   into	  being	  nonetheless,	   in	  its	  own	  most	  appropriate	  manner.”	  This	  paradoxical	  state	  of	  affairs	  results	  in	  what	  Heidegger	   calls	   the	   “the	   peculiar	   speech	   of	   language’s	   being.”119	  In	   other	   words,	  Heidegger	  acknowledges	  his	  project	  results	   in	  a	  strange	  way	  of	  speaking.	   	  But	  this	  strange	  way	  of	   speaking	   constitutes	  a	   challenge	   to	   thought:	   the	   challenge	   to	   think	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Heidegger	  writes,	  “Even	  in	  cases	  where	  speech	  is	  indistinct	  or	  in	  a	  foreign	  language,	  what	  we	  hear	  proximally	  is	  unintelligible	  words,	  and	  not	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  tone	  data.”	  Being	  and	  Time,	  p.	  207	  	  	  118	  Heidegger	  is	  not	  the	  only	  one	  to	  critique	  a	  model	  of	  language	  structured	  by	  the	  sign	  relation;	  Deleuze	  undertakes	  a	  critique	  of	  what	  might	  be	  called	  “Chomsky-­‐style	  linguistics,”	  i.e.	  a	  model	  of	  language	  structured	  by	  the	  sign	  relation.	  For	  Deleuze,	  language	  is	  a	  collective	  act,	  articulated	  through	  the	  relationship	  of	  “machinic	  assemblages	  of	  bodies”	  and	  “collective	  assemblages	  of	  enunciation.”	  It	  has	  direct	  effects	  on	  shaping	  the	  set	  of	  relations	  a	  person	  is	  immersed	  in	  and	  the	  possibilities	  open	  to	  that	  person.	  	  In	  any	  case,	  Deleuze	  also	  attempts	  to	  think	  language	  in	  a	  way	  that	  takes	  account	  of	  its	  co-­‐belonging	  with	  the	  body.	  See	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  A	  
Thousand	  Plateaus,	  “Nov.	  20,	  1923:	  Postulates	  of	  Linguistics.”	  	  119	  “The	  Nature	  of	  Language,”	  On	  the	  Way	  to	  Language,	  p.	  81	  (All	  three	  preceding	  quotations	  are	  found	  on	  the	  same	  page)	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the	   relation	   of	   bodily	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	   originary	   openness	   to	   beings,	   and	  language.	   If	  we	   categorize	   his	   peculiar	   language	   as	  metaphorical,	  we	   sidestep	   the	  substance	  of	  this	  challenge	  and	  neglect	  a	  significant	  aspect	  of	  Heidegger’s	  thought.	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